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3Acquisition and Forensic Analysis of Volatile Data Stores 
Timothy Vidas, MS 
University of Nebraska, 2006 
Advisor: Kenneth Dick
The advent of more witted threats against typical computer systems demonstrates a need 
for forensic analysis of memory-resident data in addition to the conventional static 
analysis common today.
Some tools are starting to become available to duplicate various types of volatile data 
stores. Once the data store has been duplicated, current forensic procedures have no 
vector for extrapolating further information from the duplicate. This thesis is focused on 
providing the groundwork for performing forensic investigations on the data that is 
typically stored in a volatile data store, such as system RAM, while creating as small an 
impact as possible to the state o f a system.
It is intended that this thesis will give insight to obtaining more post incident response 
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6Assumptions:
Only host based forensics are discussed in this thesis. Though interesting tangents may 
be heavily related to the work shown here (such as the volatile stores of a network 
switch) the omission of network based forensics is intended.
All of the samples and some of the text assumes standard Intel x86 32-bit architecture 
and while many things may be similar, many alterations would likely have to be made for 
64-bit platforms.
In most cases the term “non-volatile store” refers to a technology such a Hard Disk Drive 
(HDD) which is assumed to retain data over extended periods of time with no power 
applied to the device. Similarly, the term “volatile store” refers to a technology such a 
Random Access Memory (RAM) which is assumed to not retain data over extended 
periods of time with no power applied to the device. Various kinds of copies of these 
types of stores my be referred to as duplicates, copies, or images.
7Disclaimer:
Techniques described here tend to follow a more historical thought process regarding 
forensic procedures: acquire first, then identify. This may cause some privacy concerns 
when contrasted with some more modem approaches to e-discovery1 where the pertinent 
information is located first and then only that information is acquired. This distinction is 
also pertinent when considering the classification of information. Traditionally acquired 
data will need to be classified at the highest classification level of any information found 
on the system. Theoretically, when using selective methods of e-discovery, the 
acquisition could be limited to only acquire data of a certain classification level and thus 
not be subjected to the high watermark. Both the historical and selective techniques have 
their benefits and drawbacks; completeness versus speed and storage advantages 
respectively. This text does not debate these techniques.
When copying Random Access Memory (RAM) from a live system the contents will 
change as the copy is being created. This not only makes validation of the copy difficult, 
but also questions the very terms used to describe this copy. Duplicate, Image and even 
copy may not be the best suited terms, but are used here in the absence of a better term.
1 Guidance software has sections o f their website (www.guiadancesoftware.com) devoted to e-discovery 
using their EnCase product line. Additionally there are many conference presentations and whitepapers on 
the subject, but no traditionally academic sources, (e.g. CSI Annual Computer Security Conference, 
CEIC, DoD Cyber Crime Conference)
8Definitions
%SystemRoot% : A Windows™ environmental variable is denoted by percent symbols 
on either side. SystemRoot refers to the directory in which the OS is located in, typically 
c : \windows or c : \winnt.
Binary: The low-level form of an application; it is typically executable, not readily 
readable by a human, and not portable between platforms. Source Code is compiled in 
order to create an executable binary.
Boot volume: The volume that contains the operating system and its support files. In 
Windows, the boot volume can be, but does not have to be, the same as the system 
volume.
Closed source: Closed source software is software for which the source code is not open 
to public view. Under most licenses users cannot modify such software or redistribute it. 
Typically this software is distributed in pre-compiled (binary) form.
Computer Forensics: The application of computer science to questions which are of 
interest to the legal system
Digital Forensics: The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the 
preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, 
documentation, and presentation of digital evidence derived from digital sources for the 
purpose of facilitation or furthering the reconstruction of events which may be found to
9be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to 
planned operations.
Driver : A device-specific program that enables a computer to work with a particular 
piece of hardware, such as a printer, disk drive, or network adapter. Because the driver 
handles device-specific features, the operating system is freed from the burden of having 
to understand—and support—the needs of individual hardware devices.
Forensic Duplicate: Commonly described as a “bitsream” or “bit for bit” copy of a hard 
disk. More accurately it is a sector by sector copy from source media. It is stored in a ’ 
‘raw’ unaltered form.
Forensics: The application of a science to questions which are of interest to the legal 
system.
Image: As a noun, refers to some form of Forensic Duplicate. As a verb, refers to the 
process of creating a Forensic Duplicate.
Incident Response: The practice of detecting a problem, determining its cause, 
minimizing the damage it causes, resolving the problem, and documenting each step of 
the response for future reference.
Kernel: The fundamental part of an operating system. It is a piece of software responsible 
for providing secure access to the machine's hardware to various computer programs. 
Since there are many programs, and access to the hardware is limited, the kernel is also
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responsible for deciding when and how long a program should be able to make use of a 
piece of hardware.
LiveCD: Operating System stored on a Bootable CL), it does not require a hard drive in 
order to execute. A virtual disk is typically created in RAM in order to facilitate 
programs that require a file system in order to operate.
Media Analysis: The use of procedures similar to those used in Computer or Digital 
Forensics, but with no intent of involvement of a legal system.
Open Source: A movement in the programming community for making source code 
(program instructions) free and freely available to anyone interested in using or working 
with it. Such source code may be distributed only as uncompiled source, but in many 
cases also includes compiled (binary) versions for ease of use by the end user.
Postmortem: Discussion of an event after it has occurred: literally, occurring after death.
Process: The state of a program when execution is actually occurring on a machine along 
with the context required to execute.
Source Code: The human readable form of software. It is typically written in a high- 
level language such as C++. Machines cannot readily execute code in this form; it must 
first be converted to a low-level form, typically trough a process called compilation.
STOP code: The error code that identifies the error that stopped the system kernel from 
running.
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System Volume: The volume that contains the hardware-specific files that are required to 
load Windows. The system volume can be, but does not have to be, the same as the boot 
volume. Boot . i n i , Ntdetect. com, and Ntbootdd. sys are examples of files that 
are located on the system volume.
Thread: A processor activity in a process. The same process can have multiple threads. 
Those threads share the process address space and can therefore share data.
Qualified Forensic Duplicate: Similar to a Forensic Duplicate, but stored in an altered 
form (e.g. compressed) or with the addition of some metadata. The process can be 
reversed or otherwise shown to accurately reflect the same data as a Forensic Duplicate.
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Abbreviations
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
BIOS Basic Input Output System
BSD Berkeley Software Distribution
CD Compact Disk
CDROM Compact Disk (Read Only Media)
CPU Central Processing Unit
DD Data Duplicator
ELF Executable and Linking Format
EXE Executable file (Windows)
GB Giga Byte
GNU GNU’s not Unix
GPL GNU Public License
HDD Hard Disk Drive
IBM International Business Machines™
KB Kilobyte
KVM Keyboard Video Mouse
LE Law Enforcement
MB Megabyte
MD5 Message Digest (version 5)
NUCIA Nebraska University Consortium on Information Assurance
NX No eXecute
OS Operating System
PAE Physical Address Extension
PCB Process Control Block
PDA Personal Digital Assistant
PDI Page Directory Index
PDB Page Directory Base
PEB Process Environment Block
POFF Page Offset
PTE Page Table Entry
PTI Page Table Index
RAM Random Access Memory
RFC Request For Comment
SID Security Identifier
SMSS Session Manager Subsystem
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SP Service Pack
STEAL Security Technology Education and Analysis Laboratory
TB Terabyte
TLB Translation Lookaside Buffer
US United States





The term forensics has many meanings. Alone, the word is defined by Merriam Webster 
as “relating to or dealing with the application of scientific knowledge to legal problems” 
(Forensic. Merriam-Webster). In the digital arena, however, many actions that bear 
resemblance to procedures used in the forensic process (media analysis, data recovery, 
event reconstruction and similar) are often billed as forensic services even though there is 
never any intention of applying the science to a legal problem. When computer science is 
applied to a legal process it is known as Computer Forensics (or depending on context, 
Cyber Forensics or Digital Forensics).
Whereas computer forensics is defined as “the collection of techniques 
and tools used to find evidence in a computer”, digital forensics has been 
defined as “the use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward 
the preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, 
interpretation, documentation, and presentation of digital evidence derived 
from digital sources for the purpose of facilitation or furthering the 
reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate 
unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations” (Reith,
Carr, Gunsch. 2002.)
The basis of these steps traditionally revolve around preserving a state of a computer 
system for subsequent analysis and reporting. This analysis is commonly performed in 
parallel by more than one party, such as two sides in a legal dispute, and care must be 
taken to ensure that all parties involved are working with identical data. Nearly identical
15









Military Operations usiness and 
Industry
It has been shown that even when working with large sets 
of data, minute a discrepancy can have profound effect". As such, concepts such as 
chain-of-custody borrowed from 
other disciplines arc often 
adapted to digital forensics.
Even so, the Digital Forensics 
Research Workshop (DFRWS) 
uses the Venn diagram shown in 
Figure 1 (Marc Rodgers, 2004) 
to demonstrate three distinct Figure 1: Digital Forensics Communities
communities of digital forensics. Only one community regularly deals with legal process 
in the course of performing digital forensics. It has been suggested (Rodgers. 2004, 
among others) that academia be added as a fourth community, further minimizing the 
root meaning of forensics.
An example of a minute discrepancy having a profound effect is a single ASCII character (likely 8 bits) 
found in a document on a 80 gigabyte hard drive, becoming the deciding factor o f a multimillion dollar 
settlement (about I / 85,000.000.000th o f the total data). (Taub. 2006)
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Background
In the not-too-distant past, a common incident response step taken early in the process 
was to ‘pull the plug’ on a powered on machine (United States Secret Service, 2002). 
Investigators knew that performing a ‘clean’ shutdown could further change the state of 
the system. However ‘pulling the plug’ also has its own drawbacks to later analysis. One 
such drawback is the lack of ability to identity and examine the state of the machine at 
the time of seizure.
•2
Some tools allow the acquisition of the contents of ‘raw’ RAM from a running system. 
Thus far, the analysis of a RAM image has been limited to small special-use devices such 
as Palm PDAs or various cellular phones. For most forensic cases seen today, traditional 
post-mortem techniques are sufficient for the United States court process, but for cases 
involving an active adversary or completely memory resident threat (such as some 
viruses and worms), analysis of volatile data stores will not only be recommended, but 
will be required.
Many times the state of the non-volatile devices, such as hard disks, depend upon the 
state of a volatile device, such as RAM. This is the case with many forms of Hard Disk 
Drive encryption, where if a disk is powered down a secondary connection to the device
3 Helix Live CD -  Incident Response Toolkit http://www.e-fense.com/helix/ 
Paraban’s Cell Seizure http://www.paraben-forensics.com/cell_models.html, etc.
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may prove fruitless.4 In certain cases a multi-partite memory resident virus5 can even 
partially encrypt portions of a drive without the consent (or knowledge) of the user. In 
such a case, capturing and analyzing the contents of memory would be required for an 
investigation.
Virtual Addressing and Paging
In order to allow each process to have a logically contiguous address space and preserve 
the efficiency of not having to allocate contiguous memory addresses to each process, 
most modem OS memory management systems employ virtual addressing. In this type 
of addressing, processes are given virtual addresses for memory which are then translated 
to the correct physical address by the memory management system. This should not be 
confused with Windows Virtual Memory which enables a process to use more memory 
than physically available by swapping portions of memory to a secondary store such as a 
file on disk. In fact, in Windows, all OS instances are given a virtual address space of 
4GB regardless of physical RAM installed. This 4GB virtual range is typically divided 
into two 2 GB sections6 — one for the OS and one for private application space. In this 
sense “RAM is a limited resource, whereas virtual memory is, for most practical 
purposes, unlimited.” (KB 555223).
4 It is very common in typical procedures to power off a system, then attach a write-blocking device to the 
HDD before connecting it to some other device independent o f the original suspect hardware for 
acquisition purposes.
5 ONE-HALF virus http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/Print98226.htm
6 Baring some boot switches such as /3GB.
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When memory use exceeds the available RAM, portions of memory are typically paged
. . . 7(or copied) out to disk. In Windows this is done in 4 KB pages to files called the 
Pageflle (pagefile.sys). When data in a particular page is needed for processing the page 
is paged back into RAM and another page copied to the pageflle. For the purpose of this 
thesis, concepts such as reserving, locking, sharing and committing pages, will not be
o
discussed, nor will the application of rights to pages via hardware memory protection .
Virtual Address
PagePage Table Physical MemoryPage Directory
Byte
Page Directory Index Page Table Index Byte Offset
PDI Entry PTI Entry Page
Figure 2: Virtual Address Translation
A memory manager generally constructs page tables to facilitate the translation of an 
object at a virtual address referenced in a process to the physical hardware location of 
that object. Each virtual address has an associated Page Table Entry (PTE) in the table
7 In X86 without the PAE switch enabled. For x64 and IA64 page size will range from 4 KB to 16 MB.
The cost vs benefit is typically related to Translation Look Aside Buffer (TLB) efficiency in hardware and 
will not be discussed further here.
8 Since the page is the smallest granularity assignable via hardware memory protection, some concepts have 
been getting attention again lately such as AMD’s NX bit or Intel’s XD bit (bit 63 o f the page table entry).
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which contains the physical address. In the Intel x86 architecture, a Page Directory Index 
(PDI) also exists in order to locate the correct Page Table in which a PTE exists. When a 
process requires access to a byte at a given virtual address (also see Figure 2: Virtual 
Address Translation):
• the PDI is referenced to locate the correct page table
• the corresponding PTE found in the page table for the page that contains 
the byte in question, contains the physical location of the page in RAM
• finally an offset into the page is used to locate the actual physical byte 
An example of decoding a virtual address can be found in Appendix E: Decoding a 
Process Owner. It is important to note that each Windows process has a single page 
directory with 1024 entries, and up to 512 page tables, each with 1024 entries. Paging is 
typically enabled very early in the boot process, and applications benefit from virtual 
memory / paging without any alteration because it is provided by the OS, essentially at a 
lower layer than the process.
Ringed Architecture
Rings (aka protection rings, processor modes, process privilege mode), are provided by 
many processors to allow “memory access protection from two levels (user and kernel).” 
(Hennessy, Patterson. 2003). A system requires at least two protection levels to provide 
privilege isolation between processes, which becomes a foundational requirement to 
provide notionally higher concepts such as file confidentiality (Ware. 1970). Kernel (or 
supervisor) mode allows access to all CPU functionality while the non-kernel modes
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(typically only one: user mode) allow restricted access. If the architecture allows more 
than two modes, and the modes are implemented in a singular hierarchy, the architecture 
is ringed; if the architecture provides only two modes, it can be thought of as a 2-ring 
architecture. Generally, processes that exist in rings ‘further away’ from the kernel mode 
(typically increasing in number) the functionality available to the process in that ring is a 
subset of the prior ring.9 Most popular processors support a certain number of rings (Intel 
x86 supports 4), however most operating systems only implement two rings for kernel 
and user modes (typically at ring 0 and 3 respectively) and provide further protection 
granularity through OS features instead of rings. This distinction between the two rings 
is important to note for a variety of reasons, among them are the following. Processes in 
ring 3 may not be able to access data in ring 0 and this may hinder the acquisition 
process. Similarly rogue processes in ring 0 may not be detectable by processes in ring 3. 
Among other examples, this distinction between the two rings can make kernel level 
rootkits difficult to detect and/or remove. (Hoglund, Butler. 2006)
Processes and Threads
A process is the state of a program when execution is actually occurring on a machine 
along with the context required to execute: current values of the program counter, 
registers and variables. (Tanenbaum, 1997) A Windows process consists of a private 
virtual address space, the actual executable code, a list of open file handles, a certain
9 Correct implementation o f a ringed architecture requires both hardware and software (OS) support. The 
concept o f ringed architecture has existed for quite some time. The Multics project supported ringed 
architecture circa 1963 (Corbato, Vyssotsky. 1965).
21
security context, an ID, and at least one thread. (Russinovich, 2005). It is important to 
note that even in the absence of a multithreaded program, or even the possibility of 
allowing multiple threads, every process has at least one thread. Only a thread can 
execute, which counters popular terminology related to “running processes.”
Many processes are deemed default, and some are deemed required by various sources. 
Default processes are those that start with the booting of a typical installation of an OS. 
Required processes are those that are required for the OS to function. Processes may 
have familiar relationships such as parent and child, where the parent process starts the 
child process and so on. Most operating systems are distributed with applications that 
facilitate viewing the state of currently running processes such as the Windows Task 
Manager or the Linux ps or to p  commands. Using these tools, different information 
about the processes may be studied. The internal structure of a process and its respective 
thread(s)10 are paramount to the analysis portion of this text and a more detailed summary 
of related data structures will be presented there.
Objectives
The goal of this work is to assess the current methods and mechanisms available to 
duplicate volatile data stores and more so, to analyze the effects these tools have on the 
state of the system in which these stores exist. Some (most, all?) tools will actually alter
10 It is important to point out that this thesis only refers to “full” threads and not “lightweight” threads or 
fibers which are scheduled internal to a process and not by the OS scheduling routine. These are obviously 
very specific to each application and are not discussed here.
the state o f the system in question which is not recommended from a forensic point of 
view. Altering the state of the system is akin to modifying a physical crime scene, the 
evidence may not be altered, but there is no way to know after the modification has 
occurred. The goal of the media analyst is often to glean as much information as possible 
directly from the evidence; the goal of a party involved with a legal system may fail more 
in line with concepts such as burden of proof which allows for inference in many 
situations.
In physical forensics, malfeasance or misconduct that changes the state of a crime scene 
could quite likely render evidence unusable in the court system. Digitally, the court is 
taking a similar approach, however the circumstances are not equivalent. For example: if 
a murder has occurred in a kitchen, and the murder weapon was left at the scene, if  the 
kitchen is sealed and guarded the murder weapon will still exist at a later point in time. If 
a computer crime is observed, evidence might well be lost over time due to the normal 
operation of a computer system. Different, common actions on an individual system such 
as scanning, paging, defragmenting, and re-allocation of clusters/blocks can all alter or 
overwrite potential evidence on disk. These actions (and others that do not necessarily 
affect the disk) may start new processes and utilize portions of memory which may alter 
or overwrite potential evidence in RAM. The problem of lost potential evidence may 
even be compounded by common circumstances like the active participation of the 
system in question on a network. Generally, the more active a system the more likely it 
is that potential evidence will be lost.
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Regardless of the effectiveness of the methods and mechanisms used for acquisition, 
procedures will be created to perform incident response and media analysis akin to those 
in use today for traditional media. This thesis focuses on the analysis of the different 
portions of RAM used by mainstream operating systems in order to adapt current 
response methodologies to farther preserve the state of a suspect system. It is intended 
that the effect of current incident response procedures on a suspect system be lessened 
and the amount of information available after the initial response be equal to or greater 
than the information obtained using current procedures.
Scripts developed to aid in the analysis of an acquired image of a volatile data store are 
distributed open source as Appendix G: Proof of Concept Source Code Listing to this 
thesis under the GNU General Public License ( Appendix J: GNU General Public 
License) for public use. However, the scripts are not the primary focus here.
The analysis of volatile stores and traditional postmortem forensics vary greatly. 
Traditional forensics typically involves the postmortem media analysis of a file system. 
Though it is common to speak of analyzing a particular workstation or personal 
computer, the analysis is very often only performed on a file system. Even ‘advanced 
techniques’ focus on clarifying or adding to the file system that is being examined. 
Popular industry products can perform automated actions such as recovering folders, 
finding partitions, undeleting items, etc. All of these actions work toward the goal of
24
having an “evidence container” (a “pseudo” file system) in which to perform analysis.
All further analysis is done within this container. Consider a word processor document 
that contains an embedded digital picture. Contemporary tools may allow an analyst to 
quickly view all digital pictures, including the embedded picture. This picture does not in 
itself exist as a file, but as a portion of a file; however the picture by itself may be 
considered as evidence. Even the misnomer “bit-for-bit” duplicates of hard disks11 are 
parsed and data that was not contained within the suspect file system on the original disk 
is added to the container in the analysis software (such as deleted files). Thus traditional 
analysis depends very heavily on the understanding of the file system that was used on 
the original system, and the file system is the primary focus of analysis.
Volatile data stores typically have no file system abstraction layer and the data within is 
managed directly by the Operating System. For this reason, tools that focus on the 
analysis of file systems are not able to cope with volatile stores well. When considering a 
volatile data store such as Random Access Memory (RAM), other factors become main 
focuses: the Operating System in use, the configuration of that Operating System and 
possibly other information such as hardware implementation.
Particular instances of volatile stores will typically vary much more than instances of 
non-volatile stores. This variance is partly due to the changing nature of volatile stores
11 Most duplicates that are represented as bit-for-bit or byte-for-byte duplicates are actually sector-by-sector 
duplicates as the hard disk controllers on modem hard disk drives typically are only capable o f providing 
data at a sector granularity
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like RAM, which is perceived as a faster, more valuable resource than a non-volatile 
store to the system and is thus always in contention. Contrary to popular belief, data may 
still exist in a volatile data store from a time prior to the last reboot of the system (which 
actually challenges the term ‘volatile’). While most hardware is capable of “zero-ing” or 
otherwise clearing the contents of RAM at boot, many systems ship with the default 
setting to “quick” mode where no memory testing or clearing is performed at all. It 
should be pointed out that this capability is usually presented at a level much lower than 
the operating system, typically as a BIOS feature.
Much information either required for or beneficial to the analysis of volatile stores will 
likely only be attainable from the non-volatile stores. While many configuration settings
are standard, there is no technical OS control preventing something like a non-standard
12page size. In some cases, changing these settings may actually be recommended 
(Marxmeir, 2001). Data structures and memory mapping often differ between different 
releases of software. Therefore obtaining information from a non-volatile store from the 
suspect system version (like the version of OS from the hard disk) can be quite beneficial 
for the analysis of the volatile store (such as parsing processes from data structures in 
RAM. Cisco’s IOS router software alters the mapping of memory in every software 
release (Lynn, 2005).
u While this reference does not speak directly to the topic at hand, “.. .the file system block size could have 
a big impact on the system performance...” as related to databases. A search the a field o f choice should 
find many articles both by vendors and end users relating storage unit sizes o f all kinds to system 
performance. Page size can also be quite a bit different in non x86 architectures.
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Only recently has the capture of certain non-volatile stores become automated enough to 
have the potential to be a common incident response action (Helix Version 1.4, 2004). A 
few contemporary tools have built-in functionality for imaging RAM, however, once 
captured, the customary analysis of this image is done manually using a hexadecimal 
editor/viewer and possibly some slightly more helpful, yet still primarily crude 
techniques such as performing a strings analysis. The problems are in the tools and 
techniques provided to the typical forensic analyst, and their focus on non-volatile stores.
This does not even touch on the present-day debate on whether is advisable to alter the 
state of a currently powered on system in exchange for obtaining more information. 
Historically, a first responder was trained to “pull the plug” if a suspect machine was 
discovered in a powered on state13 (United States Secret Service, 2002). This typically 
does guarantee ‘more’ information to be available on the non-volatile stores because the 
system has not had the chance to perform any shutdown tasks. For example, an operating 
system may clear a paging file, or delete temporary files at shutdown. However, this 
approach will have marginal success at showing the entire state of the system at the point 
that the power was removed because the OS has not been given the opportunity to 
perform shutdown tasks.
Many texts have proposed that incident response should observe an order of volatility, 
such as processing stores in a particular order: registers, routing information, process
13 . .if a specialist is not available.. .disconnect all power sources; unplug from wall and the back o f the 
computer.” This verbiage is from the US Secret Service, but the action is not atypical.
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table, temporary files, physical disk (Brezinski, Killalea. 2002). Each type of store 
respectively becomes less volatile and more persistent as the process goes on, and in fact 
some first responder checklists may employ executing certain commands or scripts 
before removing power from a system. These procedures may include running 
commands to obtain information about the state of the system, such as process lists, 
network connection status, open files, etc. The perceived primary problem with this 
procedure is that potential evidence is being altered; many incident response guides do 
not even take this'state alteration into account (Baker, 2005 among others). Simply 
performing the response procedures introduces more processes in the process table of the 
machine. Of course, these processes will be bound to the access level that they run 
under. Not having administrator level access at incident response time, or the presence of 
a rootkit or other subversion technique may render these actions fruitless anyway. The 
order in which to process the stores becomes more complex when general assumptions do 
not hold, such as the persistence of data in memory between reboots, or the persistence of 
data in memory for extended periods of time (Chow. 2005).
A secondary problem with interacting with the machine at incident response time is a 
trust issue in using commands from a suspect machine. Techniques commonly used in 
malware like rootkits and spyware (binary byte patching, application replacement, system 
call hooking, etc) can alter the output of commands and applications in ways that make 
the detection of the alteration difficult. Commands may be issued from a more trusted 
media, such as a CDROM, but in some cases even these perceived to be trusted, read-
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only binaries can be subverted14. Due to scalability issues, this type of subversion 
technique is likely to only take the most popular response tools into account.
Related to the act of adding a process to the process table, and the argument of cost 
versus the benefit of doing so, is the concept of information longevity, f  or example in 
most file systems when a file is deleted15, typically the allocation units for the file are 
marked as available for use and the contents of these units are not cleared. While the 
block may appear as empty or inaccessible from a file system or operating system point 
of view, the data has not been cleared and can be accessed by alternate means. This is a 
primary method of data recovery for a variety of forensic tools. Similar in concept to the 
example of the extended longevity of a file, all objects have lifetimes. Memory contents 
may change more often given an active user or active processes, but this depends on the 
amount of memory, the existence of some sort of paging file and a number of other 
factors.
Even if certain procedures are followed in the incident response process before the power 
is removed, some valuable information might not be obtained. Two primary examples are
14 Some particular types o f rootkits, such as hacker defender, actually attempt to sense popular rootkit 
detection techniques in order to avoid detection.“To overcome some o f the countermeasures implemented 
by Holy Father and other rootkit authors, the latest version creates a randomly named copy o f itself that 
runs as a Windows service. This approach is effective, but Russinovich and Cogswell acknowledge, "It is 
theoretically possible for a rootkit to hide from Rootkit Revealer. However, this would require a level o f  
sophistication not seen in rootkits to date” (Dillard, 2005)
15 Deleted from the filesystem, not from the Operating System. Deleted in this context, typically means 
that the OS is not capable o f recovering the information. When using a recycle bin model, a file is not 
deleted until it has been removed from the recycle bin.
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purely memory resident malware16 and encryption keys stored in memory. Some tools 
like The Metasploit Project may use techniques like direct memory injection to load OS 
modules without leaving any evidence on the disk.
The main purpose of analyzing volatile data stores is to reduce the impact the investigator 
subjects upon potential evidence while increasing the amount and credibility of the 
evidence that is acquired. Even so, it is important to point out that in some instances 
even the acquisition process can be subverted. Situations such as the examination of a 
system that has a rootkit present create further challenges for the investigator. Even in 
such a situation, the availability of RAM contents at the time of power removal (and a 
forensic duplicate of the physical drive) would likely be beneficial to an investigator, 
even if the RAM was incomplete. A greater difficulty lies in the potential ability of an 
untrustable system to wholly deny access to data stores.
Typical incident response consists of running a series of commands -  each starting its 
own process, the output of which is stored on a secondary device so as to not potentially 
overwrite data on the disk. Each command will result in creating at least one new 
process which may overwrite latent data in RAM much like creating a new file may 
overwrite latent data on disk. A contemporary listing of typical incident response steps 
can be found in Table 1: Common Incident Response Steps.
16 Worms, Virii, Trojans, rootkits, spyware and the like. Examples would be Nimda or SQL slammer.
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Table 1: Common Incident Response Steps 
(Nolan, O’Sullivan, Branson, Waits)
Windows Linux
System Profile systeminfo.exe, psinfo /proc (version, uptime, 
meminfo, filesystems, 
cpuinfo), uname
Date and Time netstat, date, time netstat, date
uptime psuptime, net statistics uptime, w
Runing Processes netstat, pulist, tlist, pslist, 
listdlls
ps, w, top, fuser, 
modules.conf, ldd, Is
Open Files, startup, 
clipboard
dir, afind, macmatch, 
autoruns, handle, pclip
Is, find, lsof, file, /etc/rc* 
directories, chkconfig, 
inittab, cron, at
Users net users, psloggedon, 
ntlast, dumpusers
who, last, lastlog, 
/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow





There are still other areas that blur the line between the analysis of a static store and a
volatile store. Swap space, for example, resides on disk either in an allocated form (such
as a pagefile in Windows) or somewhat more raw form (such as a swap partition in
Linux). Upon removal of power from a system, swap space may still exist largely 
1 1intact . However, the analysis of such space will be similar to the raw analysis 
techniques presented here and less similar to traditional techniques related to forensic 
procedures applied to a typical file system. Traditional techniques may allow the 
detection or recovery of the pagefile from the file system, but the interpretation of the 
contents will be much more analogous to RAM analysis than file analysis. Furthermore, 
the availability of both swap information as well as an image of the RAM will allow
17 Largely is a subjective term and no assumptions are made as to the exact or expected percentage o f intact 
swap information. Each system will have different results. In fact each system will even show different 
results on subsequent experiments. The data that will remain past the removal o f power will depend greatly 
on the state and configuration o f the system.
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some comparison. Obviously the level of comparison that can be made will depend 
entirely on the system in question due to the aforementioned state of swap information.
Memory Acquisition
Generally speaking, data stored in a volatile data store is, as the name implies, volatile in 
nature. Introductory level students of computer science are taught early in their education 
that the difference between a hard disk technology and RAM technology is that the data 
in RAM is lost when power is removed from the system. This theory also falls in line 
with current movements in the Law Enforcement sector, and is fundamental to the need 
presented in this thesis for adaptation of current incident response processes. However, it 
has recently been proven that at least some hardware retains data in RAM for certain 
periods of time. For example, an IBM T30 Thinkpad laptop may retain RAM contents 
for as long as 30 seconds without power (Chow, Pfaff, Garfinkel, Rosenblum. 2005). 
Similarly, samples taken as part of this research also clearly show that RAM data 
survives reboots.
Without a specialized hardware tool designed to rapidly copy data from the RAM 
immediately after power down, or designed to clamp on to the memory stores of a 
running machine and duplicate in stream18, the examiner must resort to using provided 
methods to access volatile stores. These methods may be provided at different levels of 
abstraction and likewise offer different granularities and insight into the data present.
18 Such as the PCI described in A Hardware Based Memory Acquisition Procedure for Digital 
Investigations (Carrier, Grand).
32
For recovery and testing purposes, many versions of Windows can be configured to 
perform a memory dump upon system crash, called a crash dump. This functionality is 
typically dictated graphically by choosing the “Startup and Recovery” button under the 
“Advanced lab” of “My Computer” properties page. The “Write debugging 
information” field can be set to Complete, Kernel, or Small style memory dumps. These 
settings can also be manipulated using the Windows registry:
H K E Y _ L O C A L _ M A C H I N E \S y s te m \C u r r e n tC o n t r o lS e t \C o n tr o l \C r a s h C o n tr o l
C r a s h D u m p E n a b le d  REG_DWORD 0 x 0 =  None 
C r a s h D u m p E n a b le d  REG_DWORD 0 x 1  = Complete memory dump 
C r a sh D u m p E n a b le d  REG_DWORD 0 x 2  = Kernel memory dump 
C r a sh D u m p E n a b le d  REG_DWORD 0 x 3  = Small memory dump (64KB)
Related keys of interest are:
A u t o R e b o o t  REG_DWORD 0 x 1
D u m p F ile  REG_EXPAND_SZ % S y stem R o o t% \M em o ry . dmp 
M in id u m p D ir  REG_EXPAND_SZ % S y stem R o o t% \M in id u m p
Complete memory dumps include the entire contents of physical memory and are by 
default eventually saved to %S y s t e m R o o t % \M e m o r y . dmp (see page 35 for more 
details). Complete memory dumps will require a swap file larger than the physical RAM 
size of the machine plus 1 MB (to allow the addition of a file header and some kernel 
variable values)19. In situations involving ‘large’ amound of RAM, special 
considerations must be taken. There are several workarounds requiring registry, and boot
19 An entire megabyte is not required, but the smallest increment o f the Windows paging system is 1 MB.
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modifications to allow complete memory dumps for Windows 2000 based systems with 
more than 2 GB of RAM. Complete memory dumps are not possible with Windows 
2000 based systems using Physical Address Extension or with more than 4 GB of RAM 
(due to the page file size limitation of 4095 MB and the complete memory dump size for 
4 GB of RAM to be 4096 + 1 MB). Many administrators might readily point out that it is 
possible to have more than 4095 MB of paging space. While this is true, it is achieved 
through multiple page files and 4095 MB is the maximum size for each individual file.
Table 2: : Windows pagefile sizing by Architecture
x86 x64 IA-64
Maximum size of a paging 
file 4 GB 16 TB 32 TB
Maximum number of paging 
files 16 16 16
Total paging file size 64 GB 256 TB 512 TB
Table 3: Maximum RAM support by OS20
OS Version Maximum 
RAM (GB)
Windows NT 4
Windows 2000 Professional 4
Windows 2000 Standard Server 4
Windows 2000 Advanced Server 8
Windows 2000 Datacenter Server 32
Windows XP Professional 4
Windows Server 2003 Web Edition 2
Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition 4
Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition 32
Windows Server 2003 Datacenter Edition 64
A kernel memory dump only dumps memory pertaining to kernel level processes. Kernel 
memory dumps require the primary volume’s pagefile to be at least approximately 1/3 of
20 All Windows limits pertain to x86 32 bit architecture not observing /3G, /AWE or /USERAV boot 
switches. Some such as 64 bit, Server 2003 with Service Pack 1 can support up to 1024 GB of RAM.
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the system’s physical RAM. This type of dump differs from a complete dump in that 
only kernel level processes (the OS kernel, device drivers, and system level programs, but 
NOT user programs or unallocated memory) and is thus much faster and space efficient, 
but contains less information. The % S y stem R o o t% \M em o ry . dmp location is also used 
for kernel memory dumps. Each time a STOP error occurs, the M e m o ry . dmp file is 
replaced with a new version pertaining to the most recent crash. This replacement and 
thus loss of prior information affects both complete and kernel memory dump types.
Small memory dumps (aka minidumps) are, as the name implies, much smaller -  64 KB 
in 32-bit systems. Minidumps only require 2 MB of page file space, and instead of 
including full contents of RAM or kernel allocated RAM, minidumps include at a 
minimum the STOP message, a list of drivers, processor context, process and thread 
context, and a kernel mode call stack. Minidumps are saved as individual files in the 
%SystemRoot%\minidump directory and are named according the date on which the 
error occurred (for example, M i n i 0 7 0 5 0 6 - 0 1 .  dmp for the first minidump on July 05, 
2006).
The facts that subsequent minidumps do not overwrite previous minidumps, and that 
minidumps are relatively small make this type of dump desirable to administrators. 
However, the lack of RAM data makes the minidump type of memory dump less 
desireable for the analysis techniques described in this thesis (though the existence of 
information in the minidumps may still hold valuable forensic information). If minidump
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style dumps are the only type of dump available, some simple information may be 
discerned. Access to core binaries (such as ntoskemel.exe) from the suspect system and
91possibly access to symbols for the examined version of Windows may allow additional 
interpretation of the information in a minidump, but it will pale in comparison to the 
information attainable from a larger memory dump.
Client platform Windows operating systems default to minidump style, and server 
platform Windows operating systems default to complete style dumps. On XP and 2003 
Server platforms minidumps are created in addition to the complete or kernel dump. If  a 
complete or kernel dump file is available, a minidump can be created from that complete 
or kernel dump using . dump /m in WinDbg.
All memory dumps, regardless o f source (crash induced or somehow instantiated) require 
space for storage. In the most raw form, a total image of RAM would require at least the 
same space as the physical RAM (1 MB if in the Microsoft DMP format). Since this data 
is eventually written to disk, the possibility exists that less volatile evidence stored on 
disk will be over-written. If  possible, the RAM could be saved to a non-suspect device 
(e.g. a tape drive). If not possible, the perceived benefit of saving-system RAM must be 
weighed against the possibility of overwriting potential evidence.
2'Symbols are basically a way to give more information to a debugging tool, like function and variable 
names, that would not normally be available in a complied version o f software. Further information on 
symbols appears later.
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When a memory dump is forced by a crash, the Windows kernel actually loads a miniport 
driver to write the dump contents directly to sectors that are occupied by the pagefile. 
Because of this, contents of the pagefile will contain a DMP formatted file structure that 
can be later extracted using forensically sound procedures if  power is removed from the 
system after the dump has completed but before the operating system has been reloaded.
The M e m o r y . dmp file in the % S ystem R oot%  directory is not created until after the
9 9system reboots . After the operating system has started to reload, the Session Manager 
Subsystem (SMSS) user process enables paging upon boot. If SMSS determines a DMP 
memory dump is found in the pagefile, SMSS instructs the kernel to mark the parts of the 
pagefile occupied by a DMP as unusable. Later in the boot process, WinLogon checks 
for DMP memory dump data in the pagefile. If  found WinLogon spawns Savedump to 
extract the file and store it the % S ystem R oot% . In situations involving large quantities 
of RAM this detection and copy can significantly slow down the boot process following a 
crash dump. Because of this, when using the Windows crash dump method of obtaining 
a memory dump, a RAM to pagefile comparison will not be possible. The automatic 
creation of a minidump from the complete memory dump happens after the system has 
finished rebooting. It is important to note that even though the m em o ry  . d m p  file is not 
created until after the system reboots, the information is actually written to disk. If a
22 This is very easy to observe. Simply follow the MS instructions, as outlined in this thesis to setup a test 
machine for a “Full Memory Dump” then use one o f the techniques presented to initiate a crash dump. 
Instead o f allowing the machine to reboot to the OS, reboot using a LiveCD. Browsing the file system will 
show that MEMORY.DMP does not yet exist, even though the physical memory was written to disk (as 
evidenced by the blue screen after the crash). Upon rebooting into the OS the MEMORY. DMP file will be 
created.
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system crash occurs (or is forced), it is preferred to not let the system reboot which would 
cause multiple changes to occur to the suspect non-volatile stores. Not only would this 
reboot alter expected things like OS timestamps, but also overwrite a large amount of 
unallocated space with the newly created m em o ry  . d m p  file.
The DMP format is a proprietary Microsoft file type, but the structure of the additional 
information present in a DMP file is easily discerned through the use of tools provided by 
Microsoft. The DMP header is commonly stated to have 1MB for header information
Figure 3: DMP File Header
Offset 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
00000000 50 41 47 45 44 55 4D 50 OF 00 00 00 93 08 00 00 PAGEDUMP
00000010 00 00 03 00 00 20 0D 82 F0 D9 46 80 B0 DC 46 80 ......., <3UF€°UF€
00000020 4C 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 E2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 L .......a .......
00000030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 41 47 45 ............. AGE
00000040 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 PAGE PAGEPAGE PAGE
00000050 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 00 41 47 45 PAGEPAGEPAGE.AGE
00000060 58 F3 46 80 04 00 00 00 8C FE 01 00 01 00 00 00 XoF€. . . . (Efc>.....
00000070 IF 00 00 00 21 00 00 00 7E 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 i ~
00000080 FF 0E 00 00 00 10 00 00 F0 EE 01 00 50 41 47 45 y .......6 1 . . PAGE
00000090 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 PAGE PAGE PAGE PAGE
000000A0 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 PAGE PAGE PAGE PAGE
0 0 0 0 0 0B0 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 PAGE PAGE PAGE PAGE
00000F70 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41, 47 45 50 41 47 45 PAGE PAGE PAGE PAGE
00000F80 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 01 00 00 00 50 41 47 45 PAGEPAGE.... PAGE
00000F90 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 50 41 47 45 PAGE PAGE PAG E PAGE
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(Russinovich, 2005)(KB 309773), but for the purpose of this thesis only the first 4KB is 
useful. From this first 4 KB extra metadata can be discerned (e.g. Version and Build of 
the Windows OS that created the dump, the number of CPUs, the system architecture, 
and the type of dump created (kernel or complete)). Some of this information is in 
addition to what can be detected from the memory image, while other parts of this 
information can be used to validate the results. At the very least the presence of the 
header allows the program itself to adjust the detection processes depending on input.
The indicated portions of Figure 3 show the file signature (0x5041474544554D50 — 
“PAGEDUMP”), the “Major” OS version (OxFOOOOOO = 15), the “Minor” OS Build 
number (0x93080000 = 2195 — Windows 2000), the architecture (0x0000014C = 338 — 
i386), the number of processors (0x00000001 = 1) and the type of dmp file (0x00000001 
= 1 — Complete [2 would be kernel]).
Tools distributed from Microsoft for debugging Windows-based software, such as the 
I386kd tool23, the Userdump OEM tool, or similarly the crashdump utility built into the 
kernel, create one of the proprietary “dmp” files designed to help discern the cause of 
bugs and crashes. While these tools are not designed with forensics in mind, they can 
still provide information from RAM. Most of the tools designed with debugging in mind 
will write the volatile information to a non-volatile store, which is forensically poor since 
the non-volatile store is usually also suspect, and this action could potentially overwrite 
non-volatile evidence. A middle ground solution may be to introduce another storage
23 Found on the Windows 2000 Support CD-ROM
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location to accept the dump (e.g. a network share or portable storage device provided by 
the investigator). Different techniques must be weighed against existing policy, and may 
well depend on the circumstances of the particular incident. Mapping drive letters to 
network shares and introducing external devices (like USB hard drives) both have impact 
on the system. The best case might be that the new hardware or shares will be 
enumerated at various places on disk and thus the procedure must be documented by the 
responder to avoid later misinterpretation by an analyst. The worst case might be 
accidentally causing executables to be run (possibly via autorun) or even system failure.
Most kernel debugging tools, both Microsoft distributed and third party, require 
installation and configuration. Some even require special connections and/or hardware. 
Both installation of software and special connections to hardware may have unacceptable, 
adverse impacts on the state of the system. For this reason kernel debugging solutions 
are often not a viable choice for most investigations. Some tools or portions of packages 
are in a portable executable form and can be executed independent of the debugging 
installation. Such tools might become a valuable part of a toolkit24 designed for the 
initial incident response (first responder). Other tools such as dumpchk.exe which 
verifies the correct creation of the memory dump might appear to be useful, but 
dumpchk.exe only works on minidump files and provides no insight in the inspection of 
complete or kernel memory dumps.
24 Different packages and toolkits have varying license agreements. It may not be within the rights o f the 
purchaser to use these tools in this manner. Research done for the purpose o f this thesis was for proof o f  
concept and education purposes only. Users must verify similar usage against respective license 
agreements.
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Since Windows source code is not available to the typical developer, code level analysis 
is not available when troubleshooting even the simplest kinds of errors. To aid the 
debugging efforts of developers, Microsoft distributes what is known as “symbols” for 
multiple versions of Windows. Symbols allow a debugger to correlate application 
execution statements with function names, line numbers, etc. without the need for source 
code. At compile time (actually linking) the compiler can create symbol information 
along with the compiled executable. “Symbol files hold a variety o f data which are not 
actually needed when running the binaries, but which could be very useful in the 
debugging process. Typically, symbol files might contain: Global variables, Local 
variables, Function names and the addresses of their entry points FPO data, and Source- 
line numbers”(Microsoft Corp. 2006). The exclusion of this information in the compiled 
binary is purposeful in order to create smaller, faster binaries. While possession of 
symbols is not required to debug or reverse engineer a compiled product, it can greatly 
reduce the complexity.
Obtaining live dumps of RAM can be problematic. In addition to altering the contents of 
memory (no matter how slightly) by performing the dump, the memory will also be 
changing as the system continues to run due to other running processes. This, paired with 
the fact that it will take some time to actually obtain the dump, means that the resulting 
dump will not actually reflect the state of RAM an exact point of time, but rather a time 
sliding view of memory. Faster imaging will result in a smaller time window, and on all 
but the most active systems RAM is unlikely to change substantially during the imaging 
process, but the fact remains that it will change -  it is just a question of how much.
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Actions similar to the some of the above kernel debugging techniques can be used on a 
live system. Windbg’s .dump can be used in conjunction with Systintemars Livekd in
r y e
order to create a dump of a running kernel (Russinovich, Solomon. 2005). Similar 
results should be possible using more robust tools such as SoftlCL or IDAPro.
George Gamer’s dd modifications allow for the /Device/PhysicalMemory object to 
be copied using the dd tool (used in many Open Source forensic packages, such as the 
Helix LiveCD). Invoking the dd command is not much different in a Win32 environment 
than in a Linux environment. The only part that might appear alien to one who has used 
dd before is the input, which is an access method to the device “PhysicalMemory:”
■ dd i f = \ \ . \D e v ic e \P h y s ic a lM e m o r y  o f= m em o ry . b in  b s= 4 0 9 6
Using dd has many advantages, there is no need to install software, it has a small 
executable size for lower impact and easy portability, a simple file structure, and is open 
source. Because the file is stored in a “RAW” format, low level analysis is simple -  file 
offsets are the' same as memory offsets, however this can also be viewed as a negative
25 Live debugging is built into the windows debugger, but requires a secondary debug system to be attached 
and the debug target must be booted with the /DEBUG switch. “Local” kernel debugging is possible with 
XP / 2003 Server but does not allow the .dump and thus does not pertain to the debugging needs presented 
here.
26 Notice the use o f the bs option for blocksize. This option should be set to 4096, the size o f a page.
The actual command used for the results presented in this text was:
dd if=\\.\Device\PhysicalMemory of=e:\memory\OSTYPE\OSTYPE.dd bs=4096 
conv=noerror --md5sum --verifymd5 md5file=e:\memory\OSTYPE\OSTYPE.md5 -- 
log=e:\memory\OSTYPE\audit.log
where OSTYPE was user supplied at the time and varied by OS used. E: mapped to an external USB mass 
storage device.
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because this does not preserve the DMP file format in which Windows natively dumps, 
and thus cannot be used with tools expecting DMP formatted files. This method also has 
the advantage of operating similarly to a dd memory dump performed on a Linux system, 
which gives the tool familiarly for the user across platforms. Unfortunately it appears 
that this technique will not be particularly useful in the future. Microsoft has decided to 
change the functionality of the \ D e v i c e \ P h y s i c a l M e m o r y  object in Server 2003 SP1. 
Usermode access to \ D e v i c e \ P h y s i c a l M e m o r y ,  which is required for user level 
program access such as the dd tool, is not permitted. Kemelmode access is still granted, 
but this gives little peace of mind to the forensic investigator as kemelmode access would 
require either installation of an imaging program or pre-meditated configuration, and 
neither case is likely in most situations.
For the sake of completeness and for testing purposes it should be pointed out that 
memory dumps can also be forced. For the purpose of incident response, many of these 
methods are not preferred because they typically either require pre-meditation or have an 
impact to a non-volatile store that is unacceptable. These methods should still be of 
interest to the incident responder, if for no other reason than that of tool validation. 
Forcing memory dumps on known systems allows for the testing of tools that will be 
used in the field, and repetitive, scheduled testing of software and hardware to validate 
manufacturer claims should be an integrated part of operations. The aforementioned 
kernel debugging tools can often be used to force a memory dump. Similarly, freely 
distributed tools such as UserDump can dump the memory space of a single process, but
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this does not directly apply to the objectives set forth here and is only mentioned for the 
sake of completeness.
For Windows 2000 based operating systems (2000, XP Pro, Server 2003 and variants) 
there is actually a built in way to force a system crash, and thus a memory dump (KB 
244139). A REG_DWORD named C r a s h O n C t r l S c r o l l  with a value of l  must be added 
(or edited) to:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\i8 042prt\Parameters
This registry update requires a system restart. The keyboard driver will now have added
27functionality. When the right Control key is held and Scroll Lock is pressed twice , the 
crashdump utility will be executed and the infamous Windows Blue Screen will be 
shown with a defined STOP code of 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0E 2 , end-user generated crashdump. This 
of course requires that the system was configured to perform one of the three previously 
mentioned types of crash dumps upon a system crash.
A fairly low-impact method developed by Mark Russinovich involves loading a small 
driver ( -7  kb) called M y F a u l t . s y s  and a user level application N o t M y F a u l t . e x e  ( 
—50 kb). The user executable issues calls to the kernel loaded driver which crashes the 
system on behalf of the user level executable in various ways. This pair of files can force 
a number of crash conditions in Windows and thus can force the creation of a memory
27 Due to the implementation o f this method in the i8042prt.sys driver, this method likely does not work on 
USB keyboard. Similarly, if  a virtual machine is used and the appropriate client tools are installed on the 
virtual machine it is quite likely that the 18042prt.sys driver is replaced with a virtual machine variant that 
does not exhibit this functionality. Also, many KVMs intercept scrlck pressed twice to provide a user 
menu which may prevent the keycodes from actually reaching the system.
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dump if the machine is appropriately configured. The tool is interactive and will alter the 
state of the suspect machine, but in the event that live imaging of RAM is not possible (as 
seems to be the case with 2003 Server SP1) this may be a lesser impacting method of 
obtaining system state information than interactively gathering information from the 
running suspect machine.
Some memory dumps (crash dumps) can actually be interrupted by a BIOS level system 
restart. For example, for some time some Compaq Server systems have had a high 
availability feature that detects when a system stops responding and forces a system 
reboot (AlphaServer Comparison Chart, December 1996). In such a situation where the 
machine essentially causes a soft restart autonomously, the creation of a full memory 
dump after a system crash will likely be interrupted. A likely course of action would be 
to disable this feature in BIOS when the system restarts and use a very minimal LiveCD 
to acquire memory in hope that some of the memory contents have persisted through the 
reboot cycle. Unfortunately it is likely impossible to detect whether this feature is 
enabled on a running machine prior to forcing the memory dump.
Memory Analysis
Having some information typically acquired using traditional non-volatile techniques, or 
in some cases live response steps, may serve as an enabler for analysis on volatile data.
OS type and patch level are among the foremost important factors.
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Currently, after an incident, captured memory (if available) is analyzed using techniques 
that would be considered crude if used for traditional file system level forensics. A 
simple hex view or strings analysis may be used by an investigator to simply glance at a 
subset of data looking for something that might provide some direction. Experiments run 
in conjunction with this project showed that, on average, a cleanly booted workstation 
with 512 MB of RAM would produce 50-80 MB of largely unusable strings output. 
Unusable does not suggest that a string such as “dollar” was found, but it was not 
pertinent because this was not a counterfeiting suspect. Unusable means that, while 
technically printable, most of the strings extracted have no inherent meaning, such as 
“EWCcedh@”. The ratio of the amount of information obtained from the data is very 
low. The situation is worse if only a hex view analysis is performed without the aid of the 
strings tool.
Original Analysis Goals:
• Must work on dd-style dumps (preferred, though not hopeful for the future due to 
2003 spl) and on Microsoft DMP Complete style dumps.
• Must be simple to use, since the target user base will typically be law 
enforcement, not computer scientists.
• Must accurately produce results that would have normally been obtained by 
running commands during incident response, (for tool development it must 
accurately re-produce a pre-response observed set of procesess)
28 Strings is a program developed for UNIX and ported to Windows that allows the extraction o f “printable 
sequences o f characters” from a file -  no matter what type o f file. It is commonly used on binary files to 
aide in deductions to be made about the binary. (Strings Man Page)
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• Must work on multiple versions of Windows and Linux.
The Windows EPROCESS structure and significance
As previously stated, processes and threads are vital concepts required to be explored in 
light of the objectives. Even though internal structures are by definition not known in 
closed source products such as Windows, the EPROCESS structure can be enumerated 
using a kernel debugger, (e.g. using the Windows debugger to enumerate fields by 
issuing a ! p r o c c e s s f  i e l d s , d t  _ e p r o c e s s  or d t  n t  ! _ e p r o c e s s  command.) 
Substructures can also be enumerated in this way. From the information gleamed from 
the debugger (and available in Appendix B, C and D) a model for the EPROCESS and 
subsequent structures can be created as seen in Table 4: EPROCESS Structure. Other 
substructures such as the Kernel Process KPROCESS (Process Control Block - PCB) can 
modeled similarly, and some EPROCESS elements, such as the Process Environment 
Block (PEB), are pointers to data that exists elsewhere (See Appendix B: EPROCESS 
dumps of a live typical system -  XP SP2).
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(KPROCESS or PCB) 
block
Coimiiuii dispalcliei ubjecl header, pointer to Llie process 
page directory, list of kernel thread (KTHREAD) blocks 
belonging to the process, default base priority, quantum, 
affinity mask, and total kernel and user time for the 
threads in the process.
Process identification Unique process ID, creating process ID, name of image being run, window station process is running on.
Quota block
Limits on nonpaged pool, paged pool, and page file 
usage plus current and peak process nonpaged and paged 
pool usage. {Note: Several processes can share this 
structure: all the system processes point to the single 
systemwide default quota block; all the processes in the 
interactive session share a single quota block Winlogon 
sets up.)
Virtual address space 
descriptors (VADs)
Series of data structures that describe the status of the 
portions of the address space that exist in the process.
Working set information
Pointer to working set list (MMWSL structure); current, 
peak, minimum, and maximum working set size; last 
trim time; page fault count; memory priority; outswap 
flags; page fault history.
Virtual memory information Current and peak virtual size, page file usage, hardware page table entry for process page directory.
Exception local procedure 
call (LPC) port
Interprocess communication channel to which the 
process manager sends a message when one of the 
process's threads causes an exception.
Debugging LPC port
Interprocess communication channel to which the 
process manager sends a message when one of the 
process's threads causes a debug event.
Access token 
(ACCESS TOKEN)
Executive object describing the security profile of this 
process.
Handle table Address of per-process handle table.
Device map Address of object directory to resolve device name references in (supports multiple users).
Process environment block 
(PEB)
Image information (base address, version numbers, 
module list), process heap information, and thread-local 
storage utilization. {Note: The pointers to the process 
heaps start at the first byte after the PEB.)
Win32 subsystem process 
block (W32PROCESS)
Process details needed by the kemel-mode component of 
the Win32 subsystem.
48
Certain parts of the EPROCESS structure stand out as being easily identifiable. Similar 
to how deleted files and file remnants are found in unused portions of a file system or 
disk device, it is possible to start to find EPROCESS structures by locating individual 
portions of the structure and then testing other sections (by offset, since these can be 
discerned from the structure dump) of the EPROCESS candidate for validity.
One part of the EPROCESS structure that is easy to identify with is the timestamp
9Qinformation . While most readers will be familiar with the concept of a timestamp, 
many may not be familiar with this particular implementation. FILETIME is a Windows 
defined structure that has existed since Windows’ 3.1 but is also defined in the current 
.NET framework 2.0. It is a 64 bit value that consists of two data members: the high 
order 32 bits are dwHighDateTime and the low order 32 bits are dwLowDateTime. The 
64 bits typically represent a number of 100 nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601 . 
Once the location of a FILETIME is known, some conversion must take place to make 
this a usable timestamp for investigative purposes. A benefit of decoding a timestamp 
allows for manual comparison to disk times to process times for rough estimating and 
correlation.
29 While one might assume that this should also hold true for Threads that have similar timestamp offsets, 
in practice this appears to not be the case.
30 The FileTime structure format o f 100 nanosecond intervals (aka a “tick”) might seem counter-intuitive, 
but this allows a range o f more than 30,000 years to be represented in 64 bits at a finer than one second 
resolution. 1000 nanosecond intervals would only yield about 200 years, 1 nanosecond intervals would 
likely be too small a time interval for some processor clock speeds. Standard *nix only allows one second 
resolution since 1/1/1970. The 1970 date for the ‘birth o f Unix” makes some sense, but I am not sure about 
the significance o f 1601. Converting from the Microsoft FileTime 100 nanosecond structure to the *nix 1 
second structure does lose some information, but converting the other direction does not add any 
information and for the purposes o f this text, one second resolution is sufficient.
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Below are two offsets from a Windows XP SP2 EPROCESS structure (from Appendix B: 
EPROCESS dumps of a live typical system -  XP SP2). It is easy to see the Low and 
High order sections and in fact the 64 bit math required to decode this into a human 
readable timestamp is fairly straightforward. Depending on the debugger options, the 
offsets will be reported as:
+0x070 CreateTime : _LARGE_INTEGER
+0x078 ExitTime : _LARGE_INTEGER
or in a more detail with the same tool as:






struct  unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 LowPart : Uint4B
+ 0x004 HighPart : Int4B •
+0x0 0 0 QuadPart : Int8B
+0x078 ExitTime : union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
Uint4B 
Int4B
struct  unnamed, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x0 0 0 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x000 u
+0x000 LowPart : Uint4B
+0x004 HighPart : Int4B
+0x0 00 QuadPart : Int8B
The very first portion of the EPROCESS structure is the PCB and at the first offset a 
header can be found.
+0x000 Pcb : struct _KPROCESS, 29 elements, 0x6c bytes






struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes






+0x000 Flink : Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink : Ptr32 to
+0x010 ProfileListHead : struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
+0x000 Flink : Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink : Ptr32 to
The 16 header bytes specify the type of structure that follows. (The same header is used 
not only by processes and threads but also events, semaphores, queues, etc.) 
(Russinovich, Solomon, 2005).
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Some processes may seem to share the same or very similar values for locations (such as 
the Process Environment Block). These addresses are typically virtual addresses and the 
distinction between processes can be shown by converting the virtual address to the 
physical address. The procedure is described in the Virtual Addressing and Paging 
section and an example can be found in Appendix E: Decoding a Process Owner.
Finding processes in memory image
When searching through a memory dump, the most complete way to search for process 
structures will be to start assuming each byte is the first of a process structure until 
further offsets show that that was indeed not a first byte of a process, then to shift one 
byte and repeat the process. When considering the aforementioned sizes of RAM 
available in today’s OSs, this may very well become computationally impractical. On the 
other hand it is not safe to assume that all process structures will be allocated on a page 
boundary, but it might be safe to assume certain other boundaries (such as an 8 byte
-I
boundary for Windows ). If a particular OS implements certain boundaries, it may be 
possible to search based on these offsets in order to greatly reduce the amount of testing 
and thus processing.
31 “If the driver requests fewer than PAG ESIZE bytes, ExAllocatePoolWithTag allocates the number o f  
bytes requested. If the driver requests PAGE SIZE or greater bytes, ExAllocatePoolWithTag allocates a 
page-aligned buffer that is an integral multiple o f PAGE SIZE bytes. Memory allocations o f less than 
PAGE_SIZE do not cross page boundaries and are not necessarily page-aligned; instead, they are aligned 
on an 8-byte boundary” (Six Tips for Efficient Memory Usage)
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For each candidate structure a Dispatch Header is assumed, then data members of the 
Header can be checked, offsets to other sections of the EPROCESS or ETHREAD can be 
checked, and values of certain fields can be checked because ranges of values for these 
fields are known (such as date, process priority range, existence of a PDI, or kernel 
memory address which must be mapped above 0x80000000).
Even though each EPROCESS structure contains pointers to other EPROCESS structures 
(a doubly linked list), it is preferable to manually locate EPROCESS structures so that the 
results can include latent processes and potentially processes attempting concealment 
from tools that enumerate processes (such as Task Manager).
EPROCESS structures can be found in different versions of Windows by utilizing
k
different offsets for equivalent portions of the EPROCESS sturucture. For example, a 
Windows XP SP2 EPROCESS structure contains the Process ID (PID) at offset 0x0 9c, 
while Windows 2000 SP4 EPROCESS structure contains the PID at offset 0x0 84. (See 
Appendix F: Offset Deltas by Service Pack for more offset examples)
Windows XP SP2 EPROCESS field (from Appendix B):
+0x09c UniqueProcessId : Ptr32 to
Windows 2000 SP4 EPROCESS field (from Appendix C):
+0x084 UniqueProcessId : Ptr32 Void
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Several methods could be used to provide compatibility between the complete and dd 
style memory dumps. Since the complete style memory dump contains a header in 
addition to the the RAW memory data, the complete memory dump could be ‘converted’ 
to a dd style dump by removing the header. Similarly, during processing the header 
could simply be ignored by skipping to the offset pertaining to the first memory location. 
This skip will only introduce minimal overhead (such as having to subtract out the 
amount of the skip when reporting sturture location in RAM). Finally, the complete 
memory dump can actually be processed identically to that of a dd style dump because 
the DMP header size is a multiple of the page size (or more to the point, the first location 
of to the contents of the RAM dump falls on the 8 byte scan boundary.)
Conclusions
Acquiring a RAM image from a suspect system is potentially different for every 
circumstance. The more information presented to the party performing the acquisition 
the better. Some cursory inspection can potentially reveal some items like general 
operating system type, and physical connections to the system.
On a pre-Server 2003 SP1 Windows system, the preferred way of acquiring a RAM 
image is to use a imaging tool from a trusted source to copy RAM through the 
PhysicalMemory object. The image may be stored to a local device connected to the 
system (such as Firewire or USB mass storage), or through the network interface.
53
A secondary method would be to force a system crash and thus a crash dump of physical 
memory to disk. This method will not allow a comparison to the pagefile, but will allow 
the contents of physical memory to be acquired and analyzed later. A simple registry 
modification paired with a small program that can force a crash could easily be placed on 
read only media such as CDROM, floppy disk, or some types of USB memory sticks. In 
this case mass storage would not be required as the memory image would be stored to the 
suspect system disk. The actual acquisition of the image would happen when the 
physical disk is imaged later in a typical forensic process.
The proof of concept PERL script shows that information about the state of a system can 
be found postmortem. At the very least, Task Manger functionality can be simulated 
from a RAM image, and in some cases more information is available than Task Manger 
is capable of reporting. This does not give a responder the ability to alter the response 
based on the state in which the system is found, but does allow the state of the system to 
be preserved along with the preservation of the non-volatile stores.
Direction
The PERL script could be improved in order to make it more likely to be used by 
mainstream responders. The current state of the tool is definitely proof of concept and 
should not be considered production level. Desirable features may include automatic 
detection of the OS from which the RAM was acquired, detection of popular dump
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formats (DMP) versus raw RAM capture, or the extraction of selected processes memory 
space. Automated OS detection can be done a variety of ways, trying all possible offsets 
looking for number of processes detected, then comparing with known required or default 
processes for different OSes.
The proof of concept only emulates Task Manager information. The creation of similar 
tools to obtain other popular incident response information (like current network 
information, open files, etc) should be explored.
Several interesting directions present themselves in relation to the work done here.
Virtual machines, particularly VMWare™, allow for essentially instant RAM acquisition
^9 •because a virtual machine has its “Virtual RAM” stored as a file on the host operating 
system. If a virtual machine is suspended, the entire content of RAM for that virtual 
machine exist as a logical file that can be copied. Other directions may exist with other 
virtual machine related topics like virtual machine monitors, Parallels™, the Trusted 
Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) / Trusted Computing Group (TCG) / Palladium, 
and hypervisor architecture.
32 The “Virtual RAM” is represented as physical RAM to the Virtual Machine. This is much different that 
Virtual Memory discussed elsewhere in this text.
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Appendix A: Methodology notes
Samples were taken from different OS installations on the same hardware utilizing the 
Nebraska University Consortium on Information Assurance’s (NUCIA) Security 
Technology Education and Analysis Laboratory (STEAL). These samples were taken 
from a set of IBM Intellistation MPro model 6220 systems, with 512 MB of RAM.
For each RAM image the machine was left without power for more than 15 minutes then 
powered on and the RAM was dumped using one of the techniques outlined in this paper. 
Each Windows RAM image was created according to the following process:
1. Use Symantec Ghost to restore a known good installation of the OS.
2. Edit the registry to include the CrashOnCtrlScroll and Complete memory
dump keys
3. Shutdown the system
4. Leave without power for 15 minutes.
5. Power on and log in.
6. Attach external USB mass storage device (hold down left shift to prevent
Autoplay)
7. Insert Helix 1.7 CDROM (allow Autoplay)
8. Use the dd utility found on Helix to perform a RAM dump to the USB device
9. Unmount CDROM and USB device.
10. Force a crash using the Ctrl-ScrLck-ScrLck method
11. Reboot
12. Re-attach USB device and copy the Memory.dmp, ntoskemel and any 
minidump.dmp files.
To study RAM persistence, the same machine was used but the machine was restarted 
with the power removed for various durations between shutdown and startup. 
Additionally, samples were taken from random machines including: IBM Thinkpad R52, 
Dell Inspiron 8600, and Gateway 2000 E-4200, for non-baseline tests, and generally for 
the availability of a more diverse set of data to inspect.
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Appendix B: EPROCESS dumps of a live typical system -  XP SP2
Appendixes B, C and D show kernel debugger output of data structures found in the nt 
kernel. The EPROCESS and ETHREAD are two structures that are focused on in this 
text for the identification of processes in memory. To aide the reader, portions of these 
structures are shown in bold.








































+0x0fO AddressCreationLock : _FAST_MUTEX 
+0x110 HyperSpaceLock : Uint4B
+0x114 ForklnProgress : Ptr32 _ETHREAD
+0x118 HardwareTrigger : Uint4B
+0x1lc VadRoot : Ptr3 2 Void
+0x120 VadHint : Ptr32 Void
+0x124 CloneRoot : Ptr3 2 Void
+0x128 NumberOfPrivatePages : Uint4B 
+0xl2c NumberOfLockedPages : Uint4B




+0x14 0 QuotaBlock 
























Ptr3 2 Void 
Ptr32 Void 
Ptr32 Void 







































































DefaultHardErrorProcessing : Uint4B 
LastThreadExitStatus : Int4B 
Peb : Ptr32 _PEB



















SeAuditProcessCreationlnfo : _SE_AUDIT_PROCESS_CREATION_INFO 
Vm : _MMSUPPORT
LastFaultCount : Uint4B














AddressSpacelnitialized : Pos 10, 2 Bits 
SetTimerResolution : Pos 12, 1 Bit 
BreakOnTermination : Pos 13, 1 Bit 
SessionCreationUnderway : Pos 14, 1 Bit 
WriteWatch : Pos 15, 1 Bit
ProcessInSession : Pos 16, 1 Bit
OverrideAddressSpace : Pos 17, 1 Bit 
HasAddressSpace : Pos 18, 1 Bit
LaunchPrefetched : Pos 19, 1 Bit
InjectlnpageErrors : Pos 20, 1 Bit 
Pos 21, 1 Bit 
Pos 22, 1 Bit
Pos 23, 1 Bit
Pos 2.4, 1 Bit 
Pos 25, 5 Bits 
POS 30, 1 Bit








Pos 0, 1 Bit
Pos 1, 1 Bit
Pos 2 , 1 Bit
Pos 3 , 1 Bit
Pos 4 , 1 Bit
Pos 5 , 1 Bit
Pos 6, 1 Bit
Pos 7, 1 Bit
Pos 8 , 1 Bit












SubSystemVersion : Uint2B 





EPROCESS structure offsets: (use 'dt nt!_EPROCESS')













































































































































































DefaultHardErrorProcessing : Uint4B 
LastThreadExitStatus : Int4B
Peb : Ptr32 _PEB
































+0x248 CreateReported Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x248 NoDebuglnherit Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessExiting Pos 2 , 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessDelete Pos 3 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Wow64SplitPages Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x248 VmDeleted Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x248 OutswapEnabled Pos 6, 1 Bit
+0x248 Outswapped Pos 7, 1 Bit
+0x248 ForkFailed Pos 8, 1 Bit
+0x248 HasPhysicalVad Pos 9, 1 Bit
+0x248 AddressSpacelnitialized : Pos 10, 2 Bit
I 0x218 SetTimerReoolution : Tod 12, 1 Bit
+0x248 BreakOnTermination : Pos 13, 1 Bit
+0x248 SessionCreationUnderway : Pos 14, 1 Bit
+0x248 WriteWatch Pos 15 , 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessInSession Pos 16 , 1 Bit
+0x248 OverrideAddressSpace : Pos 17, 1 Bit
+0x248 HasAddressSpace Pos 18 , 1 Bit
+0x248 LaunchPrefetched Pos 19 , 1 Bit
+0x248 InjectlnpageErrors : Pos 20, 1 Bit
+0x248 VmTopDown Pos 21 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused3 Pos 22 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused4 Pos 2 3 , 1 Bit
+0x248 VdmAllowed Pos 24 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused POS 2 5 , 5 Bits
+0x248 Unusedl Pos 3 0 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused2 Pos 31 , 1 Bit
+0x24c ExitStatus Int4B
+0x250 NextPageColor Uint2B
+0x252 SubSystemMinorVersion : UChar
+0x253 SubSystemMajorVersion : UChar
+0x252 SubSystemVersion Uint2B
+0x254 PriorityClass UChar
+0x2 55 WorkingSetAcquiredUnsafe : UChar
+0x258 Cookie Uint4B
kd> (process
PROCESS 89202af8 Sessionld: 0 Cid: 0e9c Peb: 7ffdc000 ParentCid: 05e0 
DirBase: 0ca8a000 ObjectTable: el5c3eb0 HandleCount: 126.
Image: k d .exe



















50, 345) (9392KB, 200KB, 1380KB)
THREAD 88493668 Cid 0e9c.0ad4 Teb: 7ffdf000 Win32Thread: 00000000 
ING on processor 0
THREAD 88ffdda8 Cid 0e9c.0a5c Teb: 7ffde000 Win32Thread: 00000000 
: (WrLpcReply) UserMode Non-Alertable





kd> dt -a -b -v _EPROCESS
struct _EPROCESS, 107 elements, 0x260 bytes
+0x000 Pcb
+0x0 00 Header 















































struct _KPROCESS, 2 9 elements, 0x6c bytes 






struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
: (2 elements) Uint4B
struct _KGDTENTRY, 3 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint2B 
Uint2B
union  unnamed, 2 elements, 0x4 bytes






Bitfield Pos 0, 
Bitfield Pos 8, 
Bitfield Pos 13, 
Bitfield Pos 15, 
Bitfield Pos 16, 
Bitfield Pos 20, 
Bitfield Pos 21, 
Bitfield Pos 22, 
Bitfield Pos 23, 
Bitfield Pos 24,
10 elements, 0x4 bytes 
8 Bits 
5 Bits 




















: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
struct SINGLE LIST ENTRY,
4 elements, 0x8 bytes
2 elements, 0x8 bytes














: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to
: Struct _LIST_ENTRY, 
























: Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit 
: Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit 
+0x000 DisableThunkEmulation : Bitfield Pos 2, 1 
+0x000 Permanent : Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x000 ExecuteDispatchEnable : Bitfield Pos 
+0x000 ImageDispatchEnable : Bitfield Pos 5























+0x0 00 QuadPart 
+0x08 0 RundownProtect :
+0x0 00 Count 
+0x000 Ptr 

























: Bitfield Pos 6, 
: UChar 




5 elements, 0x4 bytes
4 elements, 0x8 bytes
Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit 
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit 










union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Uint4B 
: Int4B




struct _EX_RUNDOWN_REF, 2 elements, 0x4 bytes 
: Uint4B 
: Ptr32 to 
Ptr32 to
: struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
(3 elements) Uint4B 


















struct _KEVENT, 1 elements, 0x10 bytes 
: Struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10 b
2 elements, 0x8 bytes
3 elements, 0x4 bytes
Bits
5 elements, 0x2 0 bytes
ytes














+0x01c Oldlrql : Uint4B
+0x0ec WorkingSetPage : Uint4B 
+0x0f0 AddressCreationLock 





struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to
_FAST_MUTEX, 5 elements, 0x2 0 bytesstruct 
I n t 4 B  
Ptr32 to 
Uint4B
struct _KEVENT, 1 elements, 0x10 bytes 
: struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10 b
ytes








+0x01c Oldlrql : Uint4B
+0x110 HyperSpaceLock : Uint4B
+0x114 ForklnProgress : Ptr32 to
+0x118 HardwareTrigger : Uint4B
+0xllc VadRoot : Ptr32 to
+0x120 VadHint : Ptr32 to
+0x124 CloneRoot : Ptr32 to
+0x128 NumberOfPrivatePages : Uint4B 
+0xl2c NumberOfLockedPages : Uint4B 
+0x130 Win32Process : Ptr32 to
+0x134 Job : Ptr32 to
+0x138 SectionObject : Ptr32 to
+0xl3c SectionBaseAddress : Ptr32 to 
+0x14 0 QuotaBlock : Ptr32 to
+0x144 WorkingSetWatch : Ptr32 to
+0x148 Win32WindowStation : Ptr32 to 











struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 







struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes
+0x000 FI ink Ptr32 to
+0x004 B1 ink Ptr32 to
168 PageDirectoryPte : struct HARDWARE_PTE _X86, 13
+0x000 Valid Bitfield Pos 0 , 1 Bit
+0x000 Write Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x000 Owner Bitfield Pos 2 , 1 Bit
+0x000 Wr i t eThrough Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x000 CacheDisable Bitfield Pos 4 , 1 Bit
+0x000 Accessed Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x000 Dirty Bitfield Pos 6, 1 Bit
+0x000 LargePage Bitfield Pos 7, 1 Bit
+0x000 Global Bitfield Pos 8 , 1 Bit
+0x000 CopyOnWrite Bitfield Pos 9, 1 Bit
+0x000 Prototype Bitfield Pos 10, 1 Bit
+0x000 reserved Bitfield Pos 11, 1 Bit













struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
Ptr32 to




+0x004 Blink : Ptr32 to
+0x198 SecurityPort : Ptr32 to
+0xl9c PaeTop : Ptr32 to
+0xla0 ActiveThreads : Uint4B
+0xla4 GrantedAccess : Uint4B
+0xla8 DefaultHardErrorProcessing : Uint4B 
+0xlac LastThreadExitStatus : Int4B 
+0xlb0 Peb : Ptr3 2 to










+0x0 00 QuadPart 
+0xlc0 WriteOperationCount 





+0x0 00 QuadPart 
+0xlc8 OtherOperationCount 
+0x000 LowPart 
+0x0 04 HighPart 
+0x000 u
+0x0 00 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x0 00 QuadPart 
+0xld0 ReadTransferCount :
+0x0 00 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x000 u
+0x0 00 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x0 00 QuadPart 
+0xld8 WriteTransferCount 
+0x0 00 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x000 u
+0x0 00 LowPart 
+0x0 04 HighPart 
+0x0 00 QuadPart 
+0xle0 OtherTransferCount 
+0x0 00 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x000 u
+0x0 00 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 









+0x0 00 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x000 u
+0x00 0 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart
Ptr32 to
Bitfield Pos 0, 3 Bits 
Uint4B
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytea 
Uint4B 
Int4B




union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
Uint4B
Int4B




union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes
Uint4B
Int4B




union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint4B 
Int4B




union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint4B 
Int4B '




union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint4B 
Int4B







struct SE AUDIT PROCESS CREATION INFO,
: Ptr32 to
struct _MMSUPPORT, 14 elements, 0x40 bytes 
: union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint4D 
Int4B







struct _MMSUPPORT_FLAGS, 9 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x000 SessionSpace : Bitfield Pos 0 , 1 Bit
+0x000 BeingTrimmed : Bitfield Pos 1 , 1 Bit
+0x000 SessionLeader : Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x000 TrimHard Bitfield Pos 3 , 1 Bit
+0x000 WorkingSetHard : Bitfield Pos 4 , 1 Bit
+0x000 AddressSpaceBeingDeleted : Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x000 Available : Bitfield Pos 6, 10 Bits
+0x000 AllowWorkingSetAdjustment : Bitfield Pos 16, 8 Bits
+0x000 MemoryPriority : Bitfield Pos 24 , 8 Bits
+0x00c PageFaultCount : Uint4B 
+0x010 PeakWorkingSetSize : Uint4B 
+0x014 WorkingSetSize : Uint4B 
+0x018 MinimumWorkingSetSize : Uint4B 
+0x01c MaximumWorkingSetSize : Uint4B 
+0x020 VmWorkingSetList : Ptr32 to 
+0x024 WorkingSetExpansionLinks : struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 byte
+0x000 Flink : Ptr32
+0x004 Blink : Ptr32
+0x02c Claim : Uint4B
+0x030 NextEstimationSlot : Uint4B 
+0x034 NextAgingSlot : Uint4B









+0x248 CreateReported Bitfield Pos 0 , 1 Bit
+0x248 NoDebuglnherit Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessExiting Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessDelete Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x248 Wow64SplitPages Bitfield Pos 4 , 1 Bit
+0x248 VmDeleted Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x248 OutswapEnabled Bitfield Pos 6 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Outswapped Bitfield Pos 7, 1 Bit
+0x248 ForkFailed Bitfield Pos 8 , 1 Bit
+0x248 HasPhysicalVad Bitfield Pos 9, 1 Bit
+0x248 AddressSpacelnitialized : Bitfield Pos 10, 2 Bit
+0x248 SetTimerResolution : Bitfield Pos 12, 1 Bit
+0x248 BreakOnTermination : Bitfield Pos 13, 1 Bit
+0x248 SessionCreationUnderway : Bitfield Pos 14, 1 Bit
+0x248 WriteWatch Bitfield Pos 15, 1 Bit
+0x248 ProcessInSession Bitfield Pos 16, 1 Bit
+0x24 8 OverrideAddressSpace : Bitfield Pos 17, 1 Bit
+0x248 HasAddressSpace Bitfield Pos 18 , 1 Bit
+0x248 LaunchPrefetched Bitfield Pos 19 , 1 Bit
+0x248 InjectlnpageErrors : Bitfield Pos 20, 1 Bit
+0x248 VmTopDown Bitfield Pos 21 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused3 Bitfield Pos 22 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused4 Bitfield Pos 23 , 1 Bit
+0x248 VdmAllowed Bitfield Pos 24 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused Bitfield Pos 25 , 5 Bits
+0x248 Unusedl Bitfield Pos 30 , 1 Bit
+0x248 Unused2 Bitfield Pos 31 , 1 Bit
+0x24c ExitStatus Int4B
+0x250 NextPageColor Uint2B
+0x252 SubSystemMinorVersion : UChar
+0x253 SubSystemMajorVersion : UChar
+ 0x2 52 SubSyst emVer s i on Uint2B
+0x2 54 PriorityClass UChar
+0x255 WorkingSetAcquiredUnsafe : UChar
+0x258 Cookie Uint4B
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Appendix C: EPROCESS structure of Microsoft Windows 2000, Service 
Pack 4.
kd> dt -a -b -v _EPROCESS
















+0x02 0 LdtDescriptor :
+0x000 LimitLow 
+0x002 BaseLow 
+0x0 04 HighWord 
+0x000 Bytes
struct _KPROCESS, 2 6 elements, 0x6e bytes






struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
: (2 elements) Uint4B
struct _KGDTENTRY, 3 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint2B 
Uint2B
union  unnamed, 2 elements, 0x4 bytes





0x000 Bits : struct unnamed, 10 element
+0x000 BaseMid Bitfield Pos 0, 8 Bits
+0x000 Type Bitfield Pos 8, 5 Bits
+0x000 Dpi Bitfield Pos 13 , 2 Bits
+0x000 Pres Bitfield Pos 15, 1 Bit
+0x000 LimitHi Bitfield Pos 16, 4 Bits
+0x000 Sys Bitfield Pos 20, 1 Bit
+0x000 Reserved_0 Bitfield Pos 21, 1 Bit
+0x000 Default Big Bitfield Pos 22 , 1 Bit
+0x000 Granularity Bitfield Pos 23, 1 Bit
+0x000 BaseHi Bitfield Pos 24, 8 Bits















+0x040 ReadyListHead struct LIST_
+0x000 Flink : Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink : Ptr32 to
+0x04 8 SwapListEntry struct _LIST_
+0x000 Flink : Ptr32 to
+0x0 04 Blink : Ptr32 to
+0x050 ThreadListHead struct LIST
2 elements, 0x8 bytes
2 elements, 0x8 bytes



































+ 0x0,0 0 QuadPart 
+0x090 ExitTime :

























: Ptr32 to 












(2 elements) UChar 
Int4B
struct _KEVENT, 1 elements, 0x10 bytes






struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to
Uint4B
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Uint4B 
: Int4B




union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Uint4B 
: Int4B






: struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
: (2 elements) Uint4B






struct _MMSUPPORT, 19 elements, 0x4 8 bytes
: union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint4B 
Int4B





+0x000 QuadPart : Int8B
+0x008 LastTrimFaultCount : Uint4B 
+0x00c PageFaultCount : Uint4B 
+0x010 PeakWorkingSetSize : Uint4B 
+0x014 WorkingSetSize : Uint4B 
+0x018 MinimumWorkingSetSize : Uint4B 
+0x01c MaximumWorkingSetSize : Uint4B 
+0x02 0 VmWorkingSetList : Ptr32 to 
+0x024 WorkingSetExpansionLinks : struct
+0x000 Flink : Ptr32 to
+0x004 Blink : Ptr32 to
+0x02c AllowWorkingSetAdjustment : UChar 
+0x02d AddressSpaceBeingDeleted : UChar 
+0x02e ForegroundSwitchCount : UChar 
+0x02f MemoryPriority : UChar
+0x03 0 u : union unnamed,
LIST ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8




struct MMSUPPORT FLAGS, 8 elements, 0x4
bytes
+0x000 SessionSpace Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x000 BeingTrimmed Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x000 ProcessInSession Bitfield Pos 2 , 1 Bit
+0x000 SessionLeader Bitfield Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x000 TrimHard Bitfield Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x000 WorkingSetHard Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x000 WriteWatch Bitfield Pos 6, 1 Bit
+0x000 Filler Bitfield Pos 7, 25 Bits
+0x034 Claim : Uint4B
+0x038 NextEstimationSlot : Uint4B 
+0x03c NextAgingSlot : Uint4B 
+0x040 EstimatedAvailable : Uint4B 




+0x12 0 DebugPort 
+0x124 ExceptionPort 
+0x12 8 ObjectTable 
+0xl2c Token 
+0x13 0 WorkingSetLock 
















struct _KEVENT, 1 elements, 0x10 bytes 
: struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
bytes








+0x01c Oldlrql : Uint4D
+0x150 WorkingSetPage : Uint4B 
+0x154 ProcessOutswapEnabled : UChar 
+0x155 ProcessOutswapped : UChar 







: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to














struct _KEVENT, 1 elements, 0x10 bytes 
: struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10
bytes








+0x01c Oldlrql : Uint4B
+0x178 HyperSpaceLock : Uint4B
+0xl7c ForklnProgress : Ptr32 to
+0x180 VmOperation : Uint2B
+0x182 ForkWasSuccessful : UChar 
+0x183 MmAgressiveWsTrimMask : UChar 
+0x184 VmOperationEvent : Ptr32 to 
+0x188 PaeTop . : Ptr32 to
+0xl8c LastFaultCount : Uint4B 
+0x190 ModifiedPageCount : Uint4B 
+0x194 VadRoot : Ptr32 to
+0x198 VadHint : Ptr32 to
+0xl9c CloneRoot : Ptr32 to
+0xla0 NumberOfPrivatePages : Uint4B 
+0xla4 NumberOfLockedPages : Uint4B 
+0xla8 NextPageColor : Uint2B
+0xlaa ExitProcessCalled : UChar 
+0xlab CreateProcessReported : UChar 
+0xlac SectionHandle : Ptr32 to
+0xlb0 Peb : Ptr32 to
+0xlb4 SectionBaseAddress : Ptr32 to 
+0xlb8 QuotaBlock : Ptr32 to
+0xlbc LastThreadExitStatus : Int4B 
+0xlc0 WorkingSetWatch : Ptr32 to 
+0xlc4 Win32WindowStation : Ptr32 to 
+0xlc8 InheritedFromUniqueProcessId : 







































: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
struct _HARDWARE_PTE_X86 
Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit 
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 
Bitfield Poe 2, 1
Bitfield Pos 3, 1 
Bitfield Pos 4, 1 
Bitfield Pos 5, 1
Bitfield Pos 6, 1
2 elements, 0x8 bytes








+0x0 0 0 LargePage 
+0x000 Global 
+0x0 0 0 CopyOnWrite 
+0x000 Prototype 
+0x000 reserved 
+0x0 0 0 PageFrameNumber 
+0xlf0 Filler :
Bitfield Pos 7, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 8, 1 Bit 
Bitfield POs 9, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 10, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 11, 1 Bit 
Bitfield Pos 12, 20 Bits 
Uint8B
+0xlf8 PaePageDirectoryPage : Uint4B 
+0xlfc ImageFileName : (16 elements)
+0x2 0c VmTrimFaultValue : Uint4B 
+0x210 SetTimerResolution : UChar 
+0x211 PriorityClass : UChar 
+0x212 SubSystemMinorVersion : UChar 
+0x213 SubSystemMajorVersion : UChar 










+0x2 3 8 ReadOperationCount 
+0x0 00 LowPart 
+0x0 04 HighPart 
+0x000 u
+0x0 0 0 LowPart 
+0x0 04 HighPart 





+0x0 0 0 LowPart 
+0x0 04 HighPart 
+0x0 0 0 QuadPart 
+0x24 8 OtherOperationCount 
+0x0 0 0 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x000 u
+0x0 0 0 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x0 0 0 QuadPart 
+0x2 50 ReadTransferCount :
+0x0 0 0 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x0 0 0 u
+0x0 0 0 LowPart 
+0x0 04 HighPart 
+0x00 0 QuadPart 






+0x0 00 QuadPart 
+0x260 OtherTransferCount
UChar
2 elements, 0x8 bytes





: Ptr32 to 











union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint4B 
Int4B




union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint4B
Int4B




union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint4B 
Int 4B




union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
Uint4B 
Int4B









+0x00 0 LowPart 
+0x004 HighPart 
+0x000 QuadPart 
+0x26 8 CommitChargeLimit 
+0x26c CommitChargePeak 
+0x27 0 ThreadListHead 
+0x000 Flink 
+0x004 Blink 
+0x278 VadPhysicalPagesBitMap : Ptr32 to 
+0x27c VadPhysicalPages : Uint4B
+0x280 AweLock : Uint4B
+0x284 plmageFileName : Ptr32 to
+0x288 Session : Ptr32 to
+0x28c Flags : Uint4B
Uint4B 
Int4B






struct LISTENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to
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Appendix D: ETHREAD structure dump from WinXP SP2
kd> dt -a -b -v _ETHREAD
struct _ETHREAD, 54 elements, 0x2 5 8 bytes
+0x00 0 Teh
+0x000 Header
struct _KTHREAD, 78 elements, 



































+0x014 KernelApcInProgress : UChar 
+0x015 KernelApcPending : UChar 
+0x016 UserApcPending : UChar







: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 













struct _KAPC_STATE, 5 elements, 0x18 bytes 




























struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to
struct SINGLE LIST ENTRY, 1 elements, 0x4
bytes





































struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 
: Ptr32 to 

















struct _KTIMER, 5 elements, 0x28 bytes 
: struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10










+0x0 04 HighPart 
+0x000 u
+0x00 0 LowPart 
+0x0 04 HighPart 
+0x000 QuadPart 
+0x018 TimerListEntry 
+0x0 0 0 Flink 
+0x0 04 Blink 










+0xl2b NextProcessor : UChar
+0xl2c CallbackStack : Ptr32 to
2 elements, 0x8 bytes







: Ptr32 to 








: struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
: Int4B
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 







+0x13 0 Win32Thread Ptr32 to
+0x13 4 TrapFrame Ptr32 to
















+0x014 KernelApcInProgress : UChar 
+0x015 KernelApcPending : UChar 
+0x016 UserApcPending : UChar 
+0x164 Alertable : UChar
+0x165 ApcStatelndex 
+0x166 ApcQueueable 













+0x02 0 NormalContext 
+0x024 SystemArgumentl 






(2 elements) struct LIST ENTRY, 2
: Ptr32 to 











struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 











struct _KSEMAPHORE, 2 elements, 0x14 bytes 


























struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
: Int4B
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 














































union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Uint4B 
: Int4B




Bitfield Pos 0, 2 Bits 
Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
union _LARGE_INTEGER, 4 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Uint4B 
: Int4B





: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
struct _LIST_ENTRY,
: Ptr32 to 




: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr3 2 to 
Ptr32 to
2 elements, 0x8 bytes
2 elements, 0x8 bytes
2 elements, 0x8 bytes







struct _CLIENT_ID, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to
struct _KSEMAPHORE, 2 elements 






















struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
: Ptr32 to 
Int4B
struct _KSEMAPHORE, 2 elements, 0x14 bytes 
struct DISPATCHER HEADER, 6 elements, 0x10















+0x208 LpcReplyMessage : 










: struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 




: Ptr32 to 
struct _LIST_ENTRY,
: Ptr32 to 






2 elements, 0x8 bytes
















+0x24 8 CrossThreadFlags 
+0x248 Terminated 
+0x248 DeadThread
struct _LIST_ENTRY, 2 elements, 0x8 bytes 
: Ptr32 to 
Ptr32 to
struct _EX_RUNDOWN_REF, 2 elements, 0x4 bytes 
: Uint4B 
: Ptr32 to
struct _EX_PUSH_LOCK, 5 elements, 0x4 bytes
+0x24 8 HideFromDebugger
Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit 
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit







Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit 
Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
1 Bit+0x248 Activelmpersonationlnfo : Bitfield Pos 3, 
+0x248 SystemThread •: Bitfield Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x248 HardErrorsAreDisabled : Bitfield Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x24 8 BreakOnTermination : Bitfield Pos 6, 1 Bit 
+0x248 SkipCreationMsg : Bitfield Pos 7, 1 Bit
+0x248 SkipTerminationMsg : Bitfield Pos 8, 1 Bit 
+0x24c SameThreadPassiveFlags : Uint4B 
+0x24c ActiveExWorker : Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x24c ExWorkerCanWaitUser : Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x24c MemoryMaker : Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x250 SameThreadApcFlags : Uint4B
+0x250 LpcReceivedMsgldValid : Bitfield Pos 0, 1 Bit 
+0x250 LpcExitThreadCalled : Bitfield Pos 1, 1 Bit 
+0x250 AddressSpaceOwner : Bitfield Pos 2, 1 Bit 
+0x254 ForwardClusterOnly : UChar 
+0x255 DisablePageFaultClustering : UChar
kd;
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Appendix E: Decoding a Process Owner
One offset of an EPROCESS is the Access Token, which defines the security context for 
the process. It is defined as (XP SP2):
dt TOKEN
+0x000 TokenSource : _TOKEN_SOURCE
+0x010 Tokenld : LUID
+0x018 Authentication^ : LUID
+0x020 ParentTokenld : LUID
+0x028 ExpirationTime : LARGE INTEGER
+0x030 TokenLock : Ptr32 ERE SOURCE
+0x038 AuditPolicy : _SEP_AUDIT_POLICY
+0x040 Modifiedld : LUID
+0x048 Sessionld : Uint4B
+0x04c UserAndGroupCount: Uint4B
+0x050 RestrictedSidCount: Uint4B
+0x054 PrivilegeCount : Uint4B
+0x058 VariableLength : Uint4B
+0x05c DynamicCharged : Uint4B
+0x060 DynamicAvailable : Uint4B
+0x064 DefaultOwnerlndex : Uint4B
+0x068 UserAndGroups : Ptr32 SID AND ATTRIBUTES
+0x06c RestrictedSids : Ptr32 SID AN D A TTR IBU TES
+0x070 PrimaryGroup : Ptr32 Void
+0x074 Privileges : Ptr32 LUID AND ATTRIBUTES
+0x078 DynamicPart : Ptr32 Uint4B
+0x07c DefaultDacl : Ptr32 ACL
+0x080 TokenType : TOKENTYPE
+0x084 ImpersonationLevel : SECURITY IMPERSONATION LEVEL 
+0x088 TokenFlags : Uint4B
+0x08c TokenlnUse : UChar
+0x090 ProxyData : Ptr32 SECURIT Y_T OKENPROX Y_D AT A
+0x094 AuditData : Ptr32 _SECURITY_TOKEN_AUDIT_DATA
+0x098 OriginatingLogonSession : LUID 
+0x0a0 VariablePart : Uint4B
The UserAndGroups offset (0x068) is a pointer to an SID AND ATTRIBUTES 
structure (again XP SP2):
dt _SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES 
+0x000 Sid : Ptr32 Void
+0x004 Attributes : Uint4B
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So by tracing the chain of structures at the correct offsets, the SID (Security Identifier) of 
the owner of the Process can be determined. It should be pointed out that the association 
with the username can not readily be determined from memory only. The SID will have 
to be compared with System registry or domain specific information (correlated with 
information from the non-volatile stores).
The pointer to the Access Token is a virtual address and must be converted to a physical 
address, this typically involves breaking the virtual address into it’s parts: 10 bits, Page 
Directory Index, 10 bits Page Table Index, 12 bits Page Offset. (PDI, PTI and POFF 
respectively)
The Page Directory Base(PDB) (another EPROCESS value) and the Page Directory 
Index (PDI) multiplied by the page size (4) will yield the ID of the a Page Table Entry 
(PTE1). The first 20 bits of PTE 1 are concatenated with the Page Table Index multiplied 
by 4 to yield an ID to another Page Table Entry (PTE2). The first 20 bits of this Page 
Table Entry can be concatenated with the Page Offsett to yield the physical address.
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Example:
AccessToken = e3892033 (both obtained from EPROCESS)
PDB = 06221000
(derived from the parts of AccessToken)
PDI = AccessToken / 0x400000 = 38e
PTI = AccessToken % 0x400000 / 0x1000 = 92
POFF = AccessToken % 0x1000 = 33
PTE 1 ID = PDB + PDI *4  =6221e38
(value of PTE1ID looked up in memory image)
PTE1 = 00831963
PTE2 ID = PTE1 -  (PTE1 % 0x1000) + PTI * 4 = 831248
(value of PTE2 ID looked up in memory image)
PTE2 = 12319963
Physical Addr = PTE2 -  (PTE2 % 0x1000) + POFF = 12319033 
Unfortunately, even though that the physical address of the Access Token is now known, 
obtaining the SID is still not a simple offset. Some variable length data fields are located 
in the Access Token “above” the SID. Results from this project show that the SID begins 
somewhere between 0x198 and 0xlD5 from this point, but this is from example, it is not 
derived or calculated. Once the SID is located it must be decoded. The format, like 
FileTime, is not straightforward.
A SID is typically seen to users and administrators as :
S-01-5-21-791032918-1291200457-768897840-500 
However the same SID in it’s binary form appears as:
0105000000000005150000005634262FC927F64C3073D42DF4010000
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Table 5 : SID Encoding shows the meaning of the different parts of the SID and the types 
of encoding used.
Table 5 : SID Encoding
SID Encoded Part Description Encoding
S-01 0x01 SID Revision 1 byte
0x05 Number of dashes - 2 1 byte
5 0x000000000005 NT Authority 6 bytes, Big Endian
21 0x00000015 NT Non Unique 4 bytes, Little Endian
791032918 0x2 f2 63456 Domain Issuer Part 1 4 bytes, Little Endian
1291200457 0x4cf627c9 Domain Issuer Part 2 4 bytes, Little Endian
768897840 0x2dd473 3 0 Domain Issuer Part 3 4 bytes, Little Endian
500 OxOOOOOlf4 User / Computer ID 4 bytes, Little Endian
There are some well known SIDs and parts of SIDs:
S-l-1-0... Everyone
S-l-2-0... Locally Logged on
S-l-3-0... Creator Owner ID
S-1-3-1... Creator Group ID
_500 ‘ Administrator Account
...501 Guest Account
...1000 User Account
(1000 and higher... 1005 would indicated the 6th user)
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Appendix F: Offset Deltas by service pack.
This appendix is provided to enable a more reader friendly format of different offsets of 
windows kernel structures. The offsets shown here (numeric values are hexadecimal) are 
also available in the proof of concept source code listing in another appendix.
Table 6 : Windows Data Structure Offsets
2000 XP XP SP 2 2003
EP PageDirBase 18 18 18 18
EP processors 34 34 34 34
EP T Forward 50 50 50 50
EP T Back 54 54 54 54
EP priority 62 62 62 62
EP T Quantum 63 63 6f 63
EP T Qant dis 69 69 69 69
EP exitStatus 6c 24c ldO 24c
EP createTime 88 70 70 70
EP exitTime 90 78 78 78
EP PID(client Unique) 9c 84 84 84
EP WorkSetSize e4 20c 20c 214
EP WorkSetMin e8 210 210 lf8
EP WorkS etMax ec 214 214 lfc
EP AccessToken 12c 0c8 0c8 0c8
EP PPID lc8 14c 14c 128
EP name lfc 174 174 154
EP size 290 258 260 278
TH size 248 258 258 260
TH createTime lbO IcO IcO lc8
TH exitTime lb8 lc8 lc8 ldO
TH exitStatus IcO ldO ldO ld8
TH PID (client unique) leO lec lec lf4
TH TID (client unique) le4 lfO lfO lf8
TH isTerminated 224 248 248 250
TH startAddr 230 224 224 22c
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Appendix G: Proof of Concept Source Code Listing
The following PERL source will parse the contents of a memory image. On a 1.5 Mhz 
Pentium 3m with 1 GB of RAM it currently takes about 30 minutes to parse a 1GB image 
and 60 minutes to parse a 4 GB image. On a 2.66 Mhz Pentium 4 Xeon with 512MB 







ttvariables that pertain more to this script than to the concept.. 
my $dump_header = 4096; # assuming size of dump file header - skipping 
this is requied to decode virutal addressess
my $isdump =1; # boolean if it is a dmp file - assume not
my $header_size =0; # most files will have no header
my. $doprocess =1; # boolean to process processes
my $dothread =0; # boolean to process threads
my $simple =0; # simple mode (task manager view)
my $showoffsets =1; # show offsets - more of a CS view than a CJ
view
my $isunique =1; # use md5 to check for identical process structures 
in memory, not really sure why you wouldn't want this 
my $debug = 0; #basically an output adjuster - mainly for
development
my $pThreshold =0; #adjust a variance for how many tests can fail
for process checking
my $tThreshold =0; #..and for threads
my $version = "procloc 0.6";
my $OS = "2K"; #Should be able to autodect this - or at least
command line option
my $output = 12; #basically bitmask for output, 1 = name, 2 = pid, 3 = 
name+pid, 4 = priority, 5 = name+priority, etc
#"super globals" these variables are apparently the same for all 
versions encountered today.
# but of course they may have to be broken down by OS at a later date, 
my $kernelBound = 0x80000000; # all windows k e rn e l  virtual addresses 
are above 80000000 (except /3G systems) 
my $pagesize = 4096; # size of a typical intel page
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my $memSegBound = 8; # from MS driver memory article, almost a speed
factor increase
#Six tips for efficient memory usage
#http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/driver/perform/mem-
alloc.mspx
#my $SIZE0F_PROC = 0x2 90; #actually i think these are different by 
OS . . .
#my $SIZEOF_THRD = 0x248;
my $currentpos = 0; 




#The DISPATCH HEADER is the key to locating the different structures in 
memory. This header is
#used by processes (the original goal of this project) as well as other 
structures. The
#signature of these types change by OS version. These multiple hashes 
are switched between...
#...it could be implemented as a hash of a hash, but that usually ends 
up losing people...
# I changed it to one hash per OS...for DH, Proc, and Thread 
info...maybe a multi hash is the way...








#8 notification timer 
#9 sync timer
#This probably could be done with a single data structure, but hey... 
my %win2K = (
# DH_notification => "\x00.",
# DH_notificationsize => "\x00.",
# DH_sync => "\x01.",
# DH_syncsize => "\x04.",
# DH_mutant => "\x02.",
# DH_mutantsize = > "\x00.",
DH_process => "\x03.",
DH_processsize => "\xlb.",
# DH_queue => "\x04.",








# DH_synctimer => "\x.",
# DH_synctimersize => "\x.", 
EP_processors => 0x034,
EP_priority => 0x062,
EP_TH_Quantum => 0x63, 
EP_TH_Quantum_Disable => 0x6 9, 
EP_size = > 0x290,





















EP_WorkingSetSize => 0x0e4, 
EP_WorkingSetMin => 0x0e8, 
EP_WorkingSetMax => OxOec, 
EP_CommitChargeLimit => 0x2 68, 
EP_CommitChargePeak => 0x26c,
) ;
my %winXP = (
# DH_notification => "\x00.",
# DH_notificationsize => "\x00.",
# DH_sync => "\x01.",
# DH_syncsize => "\x04.",
# DH_mutant => "\x02.",
# DH_mutantsize => "\x00.",
DH_process => "\x03.".,
DH_processsize => "\xlb.",
# DH_queue => "\x04.",
# DH_queuesize => "\x00.",
DH_semaphore => "\x05.",
DH_s emaphore size => "\x05.", 
DH_thread => "\x0 6.",
DH_threadsize => "\x70.",
DH_notificationtimer => "\x08.", 
DH_notificationtimersize => "\x0a.",
# DH_synctimer => "\x.",
# DH_synctimersize => "\x.",
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EP_size => 0x258, 



















my %winXP2 = (
DH_notification => "\x00.",
DH_notif icationsize => 1 \x00 . 11, 
DH_sync => "\x01.",
DH_syncsize = > "\x04.",
DH_mutant => "\x02.M,
DH_mutantsize => "\x00.",
DH process => "\x03.",
DH_processsize => "\xlb.",
DH_queue => "\x04.",
DH_queuesize = > "\x00.",
DH_semaphore => "\x05.",
DH_semaphoresize => "\x05.", 
DH_thread => "\x06.M,
DH_threadsize => "\x7 0.",
DH_notificationtimer => "\x08.M, 
DH_notificationtimersize => "\x0a.", 
DH_synctimer => "\x.", 
DH_synctimersize => "\x.", 
EP_processors => 0x034,
EP_priority => 0x062,
EP_TH_Quantum => 0x6f, 
EP_TH_Quantum_Disable => 0x6 9, 
EP_size = > 0x260, 
EP_pageDirectoryBase => 0x018, 
EP_tListFlink = > 0x050,
EP_tListBlink => 0x054, 



















EP_Win32P => 0x130, 
EP_CommitChargeLimit = > 0x08a, 
EP_CommitChargePeak => OxOac, 
EP_WorkingSetSize => 0x20C, 
EP_WorkingSetMin => 0x210, 
EP_WorkingSetMax => 0x214,
) ;
my %win2 0 03 = (
DH_notification => "\xOO.",










DH_s emaphore size => "\x05.", 
DH_thread => "\x06.",
DH_threadsize => "\x72.",
DH_notificationtimer => "\x08.", 
DH_notificationtimersize => "\x0a.", 
DH_synctimer => "\x.", 
DH_synctimersize => "\x.",
EP_size => 0x278, 
EP_pageDirectoryBase => 0x018, 
EP_tListFlink => 0x050,
EP_tListBlink => 0x054,















# command line options (see usage() for more info) 
my %opts;
my $opt_string = 'svahtTpPuVd:O:0:'; 
getopts( "$opt_string", \%opts) or usage();
#i realize that a iot of this is somewhat redundant, but i haven't 
decided on the default script operation yet
$dothread = 1; 
$dothread = 0; 
$doprocess = 1; 
$doprocess = 0; 
$debug = $opts{d
print "$version \n"; usage(); exit(0); }
print "$version \n"; usage(); exit(0); }
print "$version \n"; }
$OS = $opts{o}; print "User specified OS set to $OS\n";




































print "user output set $output = ";
$output = unpack("B*", pack("N", $output)); 
print " $output\n";
}
print "User specified debug set to









%OSoff = %win2 003;
}else{




#if it is a dmp file, skip the header...not even needed really, unles 
the header is not 
#a multiple of the segBound 
if($isdump){
$header_size = $dump_header ,*
}
my $DH_SYNCRONIZ ATION_EVENT = "$OSoff{DH_sync}$OSoff{DH_syncsize}"; 
my $DH_PROCESS = "$OSoff{DH_process}$OSoff{DH_processsize}"; 
my $DH_SEMAPHORE = "$OSoff{DH_semaphore}$OSoff{DH_semaphoresize}"; 
my $DH_THREAD = "$OSoff{DH_thread}$OSoff{DH_threadsize}"; 
my $DH_NOTIFICATION_TIMER =
"$OSoff{DH_notificationtimer}$OSoff{DH_notificationtimersize}";
my $SIZEOF_PROC = $OSoff{EP_size}; 
my $SIZEOF_THRD = $OSoff{TH_size};
# get memory dump to parse 
my $INFILE = shift;
if(!($INFILE)){ usage();}
### ready GO
open(INFILE, "<", $INFILE) or die "$0: unable to open $INFILE.";
binmode(INFILE);
if($isdump){
sysseek(INFILE, $dump_header, 0); #skip header, if present
}
header();
#work through memory memSegBound at a time 
my $sentinel; 
my $test; 
my $break = 0;
while (($sentinel = sysread(INFILE, $test, $memSegBound)) && $break =
0) {
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$currentpos = sysseek(INFILE, 0, 1) ;
my $lpos = $currentpos - $pagesize;
#currently only processes and threads are tested, any DH type 
could be implemented here though









if($sentinel 1= $memSegBound){ 
if($debug > 1){
print "terminating condition found, sysread() 
returned $sentinel, not $memSegBound";
}
$break=l; #annoying workaround due to "use strict" and 




my $time = time() - $AT;
my $sec = $time % 6 0;
my $min = ($time - $sec) / 60;
print "\n Found $count structures in $min m $sec s\n" ,-
#the FILETIME format store 100ns increments since Jan 1, 1601 in 64 
bits
#unix stores 1 second intervales since Jan 1, 1970
#to keep the program uniform one must be converted to the other
# Filetime conversions
# FFFFFF0 0 00000000 = under 1.5 seconds
# 00000001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 = under 1.5 seconds
# 00000010 ooooo'ooo = about 26 seconds
# 00000000 01000000 = about 7 : 09
# 00000000 10000000 = about 1 : 51:31
# 00000000 00010000 = about 1 day 6:32:31
# 00000000 00100000 = about 21 days 8:40:18
# 00000000 00000100 = about 11 months 22 days 18 : 44 : 57
# 00000000 00001000 = about 14 years 3 months 10 months 11:59:22
# 00000000 00000001 = about 22 8 years 5 months 5 days 23:50:03
# 00000000 00000010 = about 6353 years 6 months 18 days 21:21:00
# Using this understanding, of the endian-ness and order of the bytes 
the FILETIME representation of the Unix Epoch (Jan 1, 1970) is 000040d5 
debl9d01.
89




http://www.koders.com/c/fidAB384423 820A5D2FBF7494 80D6615D03E554271C.asp 
x
# Convert Win3 2 FILETIME to unix timestamp 
sub Win2Unix4() { 
my $Lval = shift; 
my $Hval = shift; 
my $Time = 0;
my $Shift = 11644473600; # win / unix epoch shift value obtained using
a FILETIME shift of the unix Epoch
if(($Lval == 0) and ($Hval ==0)){ 
return $Time;
}else{
$Time = int(($Hval * 2**32 / 10000000) + ($Lval / 10000000));
$Time -= $Shift;
}





#String Format timestamp to human readable form (descending
significance)
sub sPrintTimeO {
my $Time = shift; 
my $Resuit;
my ($sec,$min,$hour,$mday,$mon,$year,$wday,$yday) = 
gmtime($Time);
if ($Time ==0) {
$Result = 1';
} else {
$Result = strftime("%Y.%m.%d %H:%M:%S", $sec, $min, $hour, 




#print out the first line - the column headers 
sub header() {
if($output ) { printf(" %-3s",
"Cnt"); }
if($output % 10 == 1) { printf(" %-16s",
"Name"); }
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if($output / 10 % 10 == 1) {
"Typ") ; }
if($output / 100 % 10 == 1) {
( TID) "); }
if($output / 1000 % 10 == 1) {
"Pri");}
if($output / 10000 % 10 == 1) {
"WorkSet"); }
if($output / 100000 % 10 == 1)
19s" , "Created");}
if($output / 1000000 % 10 == 1)
19s" , "Terminated");}
if($output / 10000000 % 10 == 1) {
"Proc ");}
if($output / 100000000 % 10 == 1) {
"Quan">;}
if($output / 1000000000 % 10 == 1) {
"QuaD") ; }
if($output / 10000000000 % 10 == 1) {
"Offset");}
if($output / 100000000000 % 10 == 1)
10s" , "PDB" >;}








#Test a potential processes 
sub ProcessTest {
if($debug > 2){ print("Found process candidate at 
$currentpos.\n");}
my $potentialp;
sysread(INFILE, $potentialp, $SIZEOF_PROC-$memSegBound, 
$memSegBound);
# unpack (size , what) L = unsigned long, 1 = signed long, c 
ascii string, c = char, C = uchar
my $PageDirectoryBase = unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp,
$0Soff{EP_pageDirectoryBase}, 4));
my $ThreadListHeadFlink = unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp, 
$OSoff{EP_tListFlink}, 4));
my $ThreadListHeadBlink = unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp, 
$OSoff{EP_tListBlink}, 4));
my $ExitStatus = unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_exitStatus}, 4));
my $CreateTime2 = unpack('h*1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_createTime}, 8));
my $CreateTimeLo = unpack(1L 1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_createTime}, 4));








= unpack(1 c 1 substr($potentialp,
= unpack(1 c' substr($potentialp,
= unpack('C' substr($potentialp,
16) ) ;
= unpack(' L substr($potentialp,
' L '
' L' 




















my $Win32P = unpack('L ', substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_Win32P}, 4));
my $CommitIjim = unpack
$OSoff{EP_CommitChargeLimit}, 4));
my $CommitPeak = unpack
$OSoff{EP_CommitChargePeak}, 4));
my $WorkingSetSize = unpack
$OSoff{EP_WorkingSetSize}, 4));
my $WorkingSetMin = unpack
$OSoff{EP_WorkingSetMin}, 4));
my $WorkingSetMax = unpack('L ', substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_WorkingSetMax}, 4));
my $AccessToken = unpack(1L ', substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_AccessToken}, 4));
#these are all essentially bit masks 
my $ATPDI = $AccessToken / 0x4 0 0 00 0;
my $ATPTI = $AccessToken % 0x400000 / 0x1000;
my $AT0FF = $AccessToken % 0x1000;
my $PTE1_ID = $PageDirectoryBase + ($ATPDI * 0x4);
if($debug > 1){
printf("PTE ID 0x%0.8x\n", $PTE1_ID);
}
my $temp;
#ok, this may get hairy...we're going to re-use the filehandle 
and jump around decoding the virtual memory...
#this isn't quite working yet... 
sysseek(INFILE, $PTE1_ID, 0); 
sysread(INFILE, $temp, 4); 
my $PTE1 = unpack('V', $temp);
if($debug > 1){ printf("PTE Val 0x%0.8x %s\n", $PTE1);}
$PTE1 = $PTE1 - $PTE1 % 0x1000;
my $PTE2_ID = $PTE1 + ($ATPTI * 0x4)-1; #???
if($debug > 1){ printf("PTE2 ID 0x%0.8x %0.8x %0.8x \n", 
$PTE2_ID, $PTE1, $ATPTI * 4);}
sysseek(INFILE, $PTE2_ID, 0);
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sysread(INFILE, $temp, 4); 
my $PTE2 = unpack('V', $temp);
if($debug > 1){ printf("PTE2 Val 0x%0.8x %s\n", $PTE2);}
$PTE2 = $PTE2 - $PTE2 % 0x1000;
my $PageBaseAddress = $PTE2 + $ATOFF;
if($debug > 1){ printf("Page Base Addr %x \n", 
$PageBaseAddress);}
my $useroffset = $PageBaseAddress + 0x198;
if($debug > 1){ printf ("uo %0.8x\n", $useroffset);} 
sysseek(INFILE, $useroffset, 0) ; 
sysread(INFILE, $temp, 28);
my $uSID = SIDbin2ascii($temp);
#done with the virutal memory part
#put the current spot in the file back so we can continue on with 
the search
sysseek(INFILE, $currentpos+$SIZEOF_PROC-$memSegBound, 0);
my $PPID = unpack('L ', substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_PPID}, 4));
my $ImageFileName = unpack(1 a*1, substr($potentialp,
$OSoff{EP_name}, 16) ) ;
my $CreateTime = &Win2Unix4($CreateTimeLo, $CreateTimeHi);
my $ExitTime= &Win2Unix4($ExitTimeLo, $ExitTimeHi);
my $ptestcount=0;
#except for IDLE, a process must have a priority 
if ($Priority ==0 && $PID !=0){
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: Process (other than 
IDLE) has a priority of 0 (or lower). \n");}
}
#windows is supposed to have only 32 process levels...
#0 - Idle (system level), 1-15 'variable level', and 16-31 'real­
time '
if ($Priority < 0 || $Priority >-31){
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: Process is out of 
Priority Level Range (0-31).\n");}
}
#page directory must exist 
if ($PageDirectoryBase ==0) {
$ptestcount + +,-
93
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: PageDirectoryBase is
NULL.\n");}
}
# PDB has to start at a pageboundary.
if ($PageDirectoryBase % $pagesize != 0) {
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: PageDirectoryBase not 
aligned on page boundary.\n");}
}
# all threads must be in the kernel virtual memory space 
if ($ThreadListHeadFlink < $kernelBound) {
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: ThreadList Flink does 
not point into kernel space.\n");}
}
if ($ThreadListHeadBlink < $kernelBound) {
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: ThreadList Blink does 
not point into kernel space.\n");}
}
#Quantum is typically 2 clock intervals for xp / 2000 client and 
12 for server platforms
#but for a variety of reasons it's actually stored at a multiple 
of 3 (so 6 and 36 respectively).
if ($Priority ==0 && $PID !=0){
$ptestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: Process (other than 
IDLE) has a priority of 0 (or lower).\n");} ^
}
#workinstsetmin 5 0 / 0  (system)
#workingsetmax 345 / 450 (idle)
#VADs
#access-token
#thread count - not implimented currently becuase this would 
require caching all output until the end of the scan
# and this machine cannot handle this...
#check for minimum required procesess (sysinternals has written 
about the minimal set)
#Check for default set of processes for heuristic
#check for maximum (i know there is a max in linux, there may be 
in windows...)
#Check for sync events
if ($ptestcount > 0 + $pThreshold) {
if($debug > 2){ print("Test Failed: Not a process, failed 
at $ptestcount");}




#various reasons the same process might exist in mupltipl
locations
#tracking occurances of the same process might be 
interesting, but not done at this point 
my $hash = md5($potentialp);
$uniqueprocs{$hash}++;
if ($uniqueprocs{$hash} >1) {
# print("Duplicate process detected
?X?X?! 1 !!!!!! 1 !!!!!!!!!! J 1 1 !!! !ll\n 
######################################## An");





if($debug > 2){ print(" SUCCESS: Good proc found!An");}




if ($output o.O rHIIIIOrH { printf(" %16s"
$ImageFileName); }
i \ . \
if($output / 10 % 10 == 1) { printf(" % 3 s " ,
> ' /
if($output / 100 % 10 =- 1) { printf(" %4d
$ P I D ) ; }
if($output / 1000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %4d" ,
$Priority);}
if($output / 10000 % 10 == 1) { printf(» %15d"
$WorkingSetSize*($pagesiize/1024) ) ; }
if($output / 100000 % 10 == 1) { printf("
&sPrintTime($CreateTime));}
if($output / 1000000 % 10 == 1) { printf("
ScsPrintTime ($ExitTime) )
if($output / 10000000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" % 4 s" ,
$AcrProcs);}
if($output / 100000000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %4d" ,
$Quantum);}
if($output / 1000000000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %4d",
$QuantumD);}
if($output / 10000000000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" 0x%0.8x",
$currentpos);}
if($output / 100000000000 % 10 == 1) { printf("
0x%0.8x", $PageDirectoryBase);}
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if($output / 1000000000000 % 10 == 1) { printf("
0x%0.8x", $AccessToken);}
# test a potiential thread 
sub ThreadTest() {
if($debug > 2){ print("Found thread candidate at $currentpos
\n")/}
my $potentialt;
sysread(INFILE, $potentialt, $SIZEOF_THRD-$memSegBound, 
$memSegBound);
my $CreateTimeLo = unpack('L ', substr($potentialt,
$OSoff{TH_createTime}, 4) ) ;
my $CreateTimeHi = unpack('1', substr($potentialt,
$OSoff{TH_createTime}+4, 4));
= unpack('L ' 
= unpack('11 
= unpack(1L 1 

















my $HasTerminated = unpack('L ', substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_isTerminated), 4));
my $ThreadsProcess = unpack(1L ', substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_tProcess}, 4));
my $StartAddress = unpack('L ', substr($potentialt,
$0Soff{TH_startAddr}, 4));





= &Win2Unix4($ExitTimeLo, $ExitTimeHi); 
= &Win2Unix4($CreateTimeLo,
my $ttestcount = 0;
if (($ThreadsProcess < $kernelBound) && ($PID != 0)) {
$ttestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: ThreadsProcess not in 
kernel space.\n");}
}
if (($StartAddress == 0) && ($PID != 0)) {
$ttestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: StartAddress is
NULL.\n");}
}
#thread priority base / current (if altered from base)
# extra checks on structures
if (substr ($potentialt, 0x0e8, 4) !~ /$DH_NOTIFICATION_TIMER/)
$ttestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: No NOTIFICATION_TIMER 
at 0x0e8.\n" )/}
}
if (substr($potentialt, 0x190, 4) !~ /$DH_SEMAPHORE/) { 
$ttestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: No SEMAPHORE at
0x190.\n");}
}
if ((substr($potentialt, 0xle8, 4) !~ /$DH_SEMAPHORE/) && ($PID
1= 0 )) {
$ttestcount++;
if($debug > 2){ print("Test failed: No SEMAPHORE at
0xle8.\n");}
}
#determine if this one was a thread 
if ($ttestcount > 0 + $tThreshold) {
if($debug > 2){ print(" FAILURE: bad thread, 
skipping.\n");}
#..if not, move to next test location and start the whole
process over
sysseek (INFILE, $currentpos+$memSegBound, 0) ,- 
return;
}
#similar to process situation 
if ($isunique) {
my $hash = md5($potentialt);
$uniquethreads{$hash}++;
if ($uniquethreads{$hash} >1) {




if($debug > 2 ) { print(" SUCCESS: Found good thread!!.\n");} 
printf("\n%4d", ++$count);
if($output % 10 == 1) { printf(" %16s", " "
if($output / 10 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %3s", " T
}
" ) ;  }
if($output / 100 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %4d(%4d)",
$PID,$TID); }
if($output / 1000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %4d", " ")
if($output / 10000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %15d", "
")  ; }
if($output / 100000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %19s
&sPrintTime($CreateTime));}
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if($output / 1000000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %19s If /
&sPrintTime($ExitTime)) ;}
if($output / 10000000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %4s" , i i ^ ;}
if($output / 100000000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %4d", i i j;}
if($output / 1000000000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" %4d" , i i ^ ;}
if($output / 10000000000 % 10 == 1) { printf(" 0x%0.8x" ,
$currentpos);}
if($output / 100000000000 % 10 == 1) { printf("
0x%0.8x", " ");}
if($output / 1000000000000 % 10 == 1) { printf (1
0x%0.8x", " ");}
}
#input is binary windows SID value 
#output is human readable SID 




#1 number of dashes minus 2
#6 security big endian
#4 non unique little endian
#4 domain id little endian
#4 domain id little endian
#4 user/machine id little endian
#convert a binary SID to ASCII 
sub SIDbin2ascii(){
my $SID = shift;
my $sl = unpack('H* ' , substr($SID, 0, 1) )
my $s2 = unpack('H* ' , substr($SID, 1, 1) )
my $s3 = unpack('H* ' , substr($SID, 2, 6) )
my $s4 = unpack('V' , substr($SID, 8, 4) )
my $s5 = unpack(' V  , substr($SID, 12, 4) )
my $s6 = unpack('V', substr($SID, 16, 4) )
my $s7 = unpack('V', substr($SID, 20, 4) )
my $s8 = unpack('V', substr($SID, 24, 4) )
return sprintf ("S-%s -%x-%s-%s-%s- %s-% s\n" ,




Procloc - Process Locator ($version)
2006 Tim Vidas
Locates processes and similar structures in an image of windows 
memory obtianed either by crash dump or by dd-style acquisition.
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usage: ./procloc.pl [-hvdOj [ — t|T] [-p|P] [-f file]
-h / u : this (help) message
-t / T : show threads / do not






-o : os selection (2K, XP, XP2, 2003) 
print debugging messages to stderr 




- 0 : set output options:
1 name












i.e. 1029 would be Name, PID, and offset 
7 would be name, type, and PID
example: $0 -v -d -f file
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
by
the Free Software Foundation; version 2
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the 
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 






Appendix H: Sample runs
Several different options are demonstrated to show the capabilities of the script and for 
paper print formatting reasons. Sample runs were created on an IBM Thinkpad R52 (1.5 
Mhz Pentium 3m w/ 1 GB RAM). The type of OS the image was aquired from can be 
seen in the command line, all images are 512 MB in size.
C :\>procloc.pi -h 
procloc 0.6
Procloc - Process Locator (procloc 0.6)
2006 Tim Vidas
Locates processes and similar structures in an image of windows 
memory obtian
ed either by crash dump or by dd-style acquisition, 
usage: ./procloc.pi [-hvdO] [-t|T] [-p|P] [-f file]
-h / u this (help) message
-t / T show threads / do not
-P / P show processes / do not
-o os selection (2K, XP, XP2, 2003)
-d print debugging messages to stderr


















i.e. 1029 would be Name, PID, and offset 
7 would be name, type, and PID
example: C:\procloc.pl -v -d -f file
100
This program is free software; you, can redistribute it and/or 
modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
by
the Free Software Foundation; version 2
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the 
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 
Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110- 
13 01 USA
C :\>procloc.pi -O 31 f:\memory\2ksspO\MEMORY.DMP
user output set 31 = 00000000000000000000000000011111
Cnt Name Typ PID ( TID) Pri WorkSet
1 Idle P 0 0 16
2 mdm.exe P 1428 8 12
3 mdm.exe P 780 8 1920
4 helix.exe P 1444 8 • 36
5 SOUNDMAN.EXE P 1368 8 1288
6 cmd2k.exe P 1340 8 12
7 explorer.exe P 664 8 5600
8 nspm.exe P . 980 8 8076
9 inetinfo.exe P 960 8 7412
10 userinit.exe P 228 8 12
11 NSUM.exe P 1060 8 3 312
12 dfssvc.exe P 932 8 1212
13 snmp.exe P 000000 8> 3072
14 regsvc.exe P 832 8 812
15 nvsvc32.exe P 720 8 1008
16 NSCM.exe P 692 8 2744
17 NSPMON.exe P 668 8 1424
18 mstask.exe P 852 8 1812
19 llssrv.exe P 600 9 1748
2 0 svchost.exe P 580 8 3 316
21 msdtc.exe P 476 8 3068
22 SPOOLSV.EXE P 448 8 2896
2 3 svchost.exe P 424 8 2216
24 rundll32.exe P 1292 8 12
25 lsass.exe P 244 13 4336
2 6 services.exe P 232 9 10928
2 7 winlogon.exe P 204 13 1828
28 csrss.exe P 184 13 1904
2 9 smss.exe P 160 11 344
3 0 System P 8 8 212
Found 3 0 structures in 6 m 56 s -
C :\>procloc.pi -O 97 f:\memory\2ksspO\MEMORY.DMP 































































05 . 24 
05 .24 






05 . 24 
05 .24 
05 .24 
05 . 24 
05 .24 












05 . 24 
05 . 24 
05.24
Terminated
23:26:42 2006.05.24 23:44:29 
23:44:45
23:29:44 2006.05.24 23:44:33 
23 :26:40
23:30:24 2006.05.24 23:44:26 

















23:44:38 2006.05.24 23:44:40 
23:21:2 2 
23:21:22 
23 : 21 : 21 
23 :21:20 
2 3:21:17
in 6 m 32 s
C :\>procloc.pi -O 8065 f:\memory\2ksspO\MEMORY.DMP
user output set 8 065 = 0 000000 0 00 0 00 00 0 00011111100 0 00 01
Cnt Name Proc Quan QuaD Offset PDB AToken
1 Idle 1 127 0 0x00409b68 0x00030000 0xel001770
2 mdm.exe 0 36 0 0x01b07d68 0x0c2b6000 0x00000000
3 mdm.exe 0 36 0 0x01b08028 0xl0b4d000 Oxelf5c9b0
4 helix.exe 0 36 0 0x0Ibl95a8 0xl059b000 OxelfOf8b0
5 SOUNDMAN.EXE 0 36 0 0x01b22c28 OxObfC9000 Oxelf0e250
6 cmd2k.exe 0 36 0 0x01b30628 0x0c814000 0x00000000
7 explorer.exe 0 36 0 0x01ba7ae8 OxOblf4000 Oxelcfe5d0
8 nspm.exe 0 36 0 0x01be4a88 0x08b2d000 0xele80870
9 inetinfo.exe 0 36 0 0x01beb7e8 0x08b36000 0xele7ad30
10 userinit.exe 0 36 0 OxOlbfa02 8 0x0b41f000 0xele6b2b0
11 NSUM.exe 0 36 0 0x01c80948 0x08f50000 0xelcd803 0
12 dfssvc.exe 0 36 0 0x01c83c88 0x086e0000 0xele30330
13 snmp.exe 0 36 0 0x01c8ad68 0x086cc000 0xele2b6d0
14 regsvc.exe 0 36 0 0x01ce36c8 0x0840b000 0xeld63cf0
15 nvsvc32.exe 0 36 0 0x01cec028 0x07172000 0xelc5ecf0
16 NSCM.exe 0 36 0 OxOlcf6428 0x06e6d000 0xelcc6bf0
17 NSPMON.exe 0 36 0 OxOlcf94c8 0x071dd000 0xelcbfd50
18 mstask.exe 0 36 0 OxOlcfela8 0x08360000 0xeld71db0
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19 llssrv.exe 0 36 0 0x01dlb028 0x068ba000 0xelc7b250
20 svchost.exe 0 36 0 OxOldlf888 0x06c2e000 0xelc75el0
21 msdtc.exe 0 36 0 0x01d35928 0x06626000 0xelc6c750
22 SPOOLSV.EXE 0 36 0 0x01d3a848 0x064al000 0xelc675f0
23 svchost.exe 0 36 0 0x01d46508 0x06547000 0xelc62270
24 rundll32.exe 0 36 0 0x01d5f708 0xla87b000 0x00000000
25 Isass.exe 0 36 0 0x01d6cca8 0x05b2a0 0 0 0xelcl6030
26 services.exe 0 36 0 0x01d6e948 0x05a5a000 0xelcl3 910
27 winlogon.exe 0 36 0 0x01d7eca8 0x05883000 0xelb45590
28 csrss.exe 0 36 0 0x01el402 8 0x04bfeOOO Oxelaef3b0
29 smss.exe 0 36 0 0x01e31408 0x03b3a000 0xel401el0
30 System 0 36 0 0x020449e8 0x00030000 OxelO 0177 0
Found 3 0 structures in 6 m 42 s 
C:\ >procloc.pl -o XP2 -s f:\memory\xpsp2\xpsp2.dd
User specified OS set to XP2
Cnt Name Typ PID
1 Idle P 0
2 rundll32.exe P 1124
3 helix.exe P 836
4 SOUNDMAN.EXE P 1224
5 msmsgs.exe P 1340
6 alg.exe P 608
7 nvsvc32.exe P 204
8 regedit.exe P 1964
9 spoolsv.exe P 1892
10 svchost.exe P 1420
11 svchost.exe P 1552
12 svchost.exe P 1676
13 svchost.exe P 1172
14 svchost.exe P 1108
15 lsass.exe P 920
16 services.exe P 908
17 wscntfy.exe P 736
• 18 csrss.exe P 832
19 explorer.exe P 1068
20 wuauclt.exe P 1584
21 winlogon.exe P 864
22 smss.exe P 776
23 System P 4
Found 2 3 structures in 6 m 58 s
C :\>procloc.pi -t -0 1031 f:\memory\2kssp3\MEMORY.DMP 
user output set 1031 = 00000000000000000000010000000111
Cnt Name Typ PID ( TID) Offset
1 Idle P 0 0x0040d5e8
2 T 0 ( 0) 0x0040d878
3 T 936( 524) 0x01712ca8
4 T 1764( 336) 0x017e7da8
5 T 284 (1384) 0x0182d488
6 T 924(1572) 0x0182e988
7 T 596(1520) 0x0182fda8
8 T 1684(1768) 0x01832028
9 T 596(1748) 0x01833788
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10 T 1684 1692) 0x018359c8
11 T 1684 1688) 0x01835da8
12 T 5 96 1704) 0x0183 9da8
13 T 596 1652) 0x0183a4e8
14 T 244 1640) 0x0183bda8
15 T 1516 1616) 0x0183e4e8
16 T 244 1628) 0x0183f0e8
17 T 244 1348) 0x01853148
18 T 1516 1636) 0x018538c8
19 T 232 1632) 0x01857848
20 T 1516 1624) 0x0185b028
21 T 1612 1608) 0x01864508
22 SOUNDMAN,EXE P 1612 0x01864 7c8
23 T 1516 1604) 0x01864a88
24 T 1516 1600) 0x01864d08
25 T 1516 1596) 0x01866428
2 6 wuauc11.exe P 284 0x0186a928
27 T 1516 1096) 0x0186b728
28 T 1516 1568) 0x0186d748
29 T 1516 1592) 0x0186e9c8
3 0 rundll32.exe P 1364 0x0186flc8
31 T 1516 1564) 0x018702e8
32 T 184 644) 0x0187e028
33 T 1672 1760) 0x01898028
34 T 1672 1756) 0x01898b28
35 T 1684 1732) 0x018a7028
36 T 1684 1696) 0x018a8da8
37 T 1516 1556) 0x018aa028
38 T 596 1664) 0x018ab028
39 T 284 1392) 0x018b0988
40 T 1684 1680) 0x018b4028
41 T 1516 480) 0x018b5028
42 T 496 1588) 0x018b8028
43 T 992 1668) 0x018b83a8
44 T 948 280) 0x018b8628
45 T 436 880) 0x018b88a8
46 T 704 372) 0x018b8da8
4 7 dd.exe P 1464 0x018ba028
48 T 1764 1776) 0x018cfda8
4 9 helix.exe P 1764 0x018d0028
50 T 8 1228) 0x018dlaa8
<trimmed for brevity>
351 SERVICES.EXE P 232 OxOlacfac8
352 T 180 ( 220) 0x01ad0808
353 T 184 ( 208) 0x0lad2028
354 T 184 ( 212) 0x01ad2a48
355 T 184 ( 2U4) UxUladc2 88
356 T 180 ( 148 ) OxOladf8e8
357 WINLOGON.EXE P 180 OxOladfb68
358 T 184 ( 200) 0x01ae0308
359 T 184 ( 196) 0x01ae0608
360 T 184 ( 192) 0x01ae0a28
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-361 T 184 ( 188) 0x01ae22e8
362 CSRSS.EXE P 184 0x01b960c8
363 T 160 ( 176) 0x01b96548
364 T 160 ( 172) 0x01b96888
365 T 160 ( 112) 0x01b96b28
366 SMSS.EXE P 160 0x01bb3328
367 T 8 ( 152) 0x01bb36e8
368 T 8 ( 132) 0x0lbb4028
369 T 8 ( 144) 0x01bb4b2 8
370 T 8 ( 140) 0x01bb4da8
371 T 8 ( 136) 0x01bb7 0 88
372 T 160 ( 156) 0x01bba028
373 T 160 ( 168) 0x01bba9c8
374 T 160 ( 164) 0x01bbac68
375 T 8 ( 128) 0x01c0ble8
376 T 8 ( 124) 0x01cl8 0e8
377 T 8 ( 120) 0x01cl836 8
378 T 8 ( 108) OxOlfel408
379 T 8 ( 104) OxOlfe7588
380 T 8 ( 100) 0x02035028
381 T 8 ( 92) 0x02 03b02 8
382 T 8 ( 76) 0x0203f028
383 T 8 ( 88) 0x0203f328
384 T 8 ( 84) 0x0203fb28
385 T 8 ( 80) 0x0203fda8
386 T 8 ( 72) 0x02 0402e8
387 T 8 ( 60) 0x02041028
388 T 8 ( 68) 0x02041b28
389 T 8 ( 64) 0x02041da8
390 T 8 ( 36) 0x02042028
391 T 8 ( 56) 0x02 042 3a8
392 T 8 ( 52) 0x02042628
393 T 8 ( 48) 0x020428a8
3 94 T 8 ( 44) 0x02042b28
3 95 T 8 ( 40) 0x02042da8
396 T 8 ( 12) 0x02043028
397 T 8 ( 32) 0x020433a8
398 T 8 ( 28) 0x02043628
399 T 8 ( 24) 0x020438a8
400 T 8 ( 20) 0x02043b28
401 T 8 ( 16) 0x02043da8
402 T 8 ( 4) 0x02044768
403 System P 8 0x020449e8
404 T 8 ( 96) 0x020596e8
Found 4 04 structures in 6 m 26 s
C:\>
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Appendix I: Linux Acquisition
Kcore exists in the /proc filesystem, it is essentially a virtual view of physical RAM. 
Kcore might be the preferred way to image memory in Linux because shows memory in a 
structured way: ELF format. Supposedly kcore is only 4kb larger than Physical RAM, 
experiments done as part of this project show that there may actually be larger difference 
in file size. Different distributions implement kcore differently and Kernel Development 
lists have even long considered removing kcore altogether (/proc/kcore May Be Going 
Away, 2003), so it’s long term reliability may be questionable.
You can enumerate the file type of kcore with the file command, and creating an image 
of RAM is as simple as using the dd command:
$>file /proc/kcore
/proc/kcore: ELF 32-bit LSB core file Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV),
SVR4-style, SVR4-style, from 'vmlinux'
$>dccidd < /proc/kcore | <something to receive the memory -  netcat?>
Redhat (and possibly other distributions) does not support reading kcore. To re-enable 
this feature, you have to uncomment the lines that limits its usage -  basically restoring 
the functionality that exists in the non-Redhat-modified Linux kernel.
Savekore is available in unix and variants like Solaris, but not typically in Linux. To 
approximate some of the functionality presented earlier for Windows, there are several 
additions or modifications that can be performed to Linux systems. There is an Open
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Source (sourceforge) project called Linux Kernel Crash Dump (LKCD), that requires 
kernel patching (pre-incident). Mission Critical Linux has a patch called MCore. Redhat 
Advanced Server 2.1+ (Enterprise Level - pay product) offers some tools like Netdump 
and Crash. Rational and implementation notes are available online (Johnson, 2002).
/dev/mem and /dev/kmem may very well be implemented in a more standard way, but are 
also more “dangerous” to use as they are essentially devices. Similar to kcore, Redhat 
(and possibly others) restricts access, basically only allowing access to the first 1 MB.
Analysis
The methodology is similar to the proof on concept for Windows RAM dumps, with 
Linux the EPROCESS similar structure is task_struct, task structs are doubly linked, 
pages are the same: 4096 bytes, and there is a kernel / user bound (though the bound is 
1GB / 3 GB, so similar to the /3GB Windows boot switch so the boundary would be 
OxcOOOOOOO instead of 0x80000000).
Gdb is an Open Source debugger provided with many distributions of Linux. Symbols 
are available in Linux and, just as in windows, can aide in debugging binaries by helping 
associate function names, variable names and similar. Unlike Windows, in Linux 
symbols are a plain text file typically called System.map found in /boot/.
33 If stability is not an issue (ie you are about to ‘pull the plug’ anyway) an attempt at copying /dev/mem 
should be attempted. All tests, albeit not extensive, performed as research for this project showed no 
stability issues with using /dev/mem as input for dd.
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The init task symbol can be found with:
$> cat /boot/System.map | grep in ittask  
c0479b2c r ksymtab init task
c047ef28 r  kstrtab init task
c048cba0 D init task
The line of interest it is the one with the “D”
Similar to how the offsets for parts of an EFROCESS structure were located for windows 
using the structure output from a windows debugger (Appendixes B-D), the Linux kernel 
source can be inspected to located similar part of the process structure in Linux.
The template for a task structure can be found in sched.h(about 1100 lines of code):
$>cat /usr/src/linux-KERNELVERSION/include/sched.h 
A sample task struct listing from a 2.6.10 kernel can be found at the end of this 
Appendix. It is easy to see the similarity to the EPROCESS structure (related to the goals 
of this paper anyway).
Converting a Virtual Address to a Physical Address actually requires more steps than in 
Windows. Each task has a memory map struct, keeping track of virtual memory area , 
structs. In Virtual Memory, there is a virtual file which has a pointer to a dentry which 
has a pointer to an inode which has a mapping into address space. This address space 
actually tracks page descriptors.
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Research done during the creation of this text revealed that Mariusz Burdach actually has 
already created documentation similar to what has been proposed for Linux. Rather than 
replicate his work here, a citation is given to his work and it is up to the reader to study 
his work at their leisure. (Burdach, 2004).
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Linux Task Structure (from sched.h kernel 2.6.10)
struct task_struct {
volatile long state; /* -1 unrunnable, 0 runnable, >0 stopped */ 
struct thread_info *thread_info; 
atomic_t usage;
unsigned long flags; /* per process flags, defined below */ 
unsigned long ptrace;
int lock_depth; ' /* Lock depth */
int prio, static_prio; 




unsigned long long timestamp, last_ran;
int activated;
unsigned long policy; 
cpumask_t cpus_allowed;






* ptrace_list/ptrace_children forms the list of my children
* that were stolen by a ptracer.
* /
struct list_head ptrace_children; 
struct list_head ptrace_list;
struct mm_struct *mm, *active_mm;




int pdeath_signal; /* The signal sent when the parent dies */
/  * ? ? ? * /





* pointers to (original) parent process, youngest child, younger sibling,
* older sibling, respectively. (p->father can be replaced with
* p->parent->pid)
* /
struct task_struct *real_parent; /* real parent process (when being debugged) */
struct task_struct *parent; /* parent process */
/ *
* children/sibling forms the list of my children plus the
* tasks I'm ptracing.
* /
struct list_head children; /* list of my children *,/
struct list_head sibling; /* linkage in my parent's children list */
struct task_struct *group_leader; /* threadgroup leader */
/* PID/PID hash table linkage. */
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struct pid pids[PIDTYPE_MAX];
wait_queue_head_t wait_chldexit; /* for wait4 () */
struct completion *vfork_done; /* for vfork() */
int  user *set_child_tid; /* CLONE_CHILD_SETTID */
int  user *clear_child_tid; /* CL0NE_CHILD_CLEARTID */
unsigned long rt_priority;
unsigned long it_real_value, it_prof_value, it_virt_value; 
unsigned long it_real_incr, it__prof_incr, it_virt_incr; 
struct timer_list real_timer; 
unsigned long utime, stime;
unsigned long nvcsw, nivcsw; /* context switch counts */
struct timespec start_time;
/* mm fault and swap info: this can arguably be seen as either mm-specific or thread- 
specific */
unsigned long min_flt, maj_flt;




kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted; 
unsigned keep_capabilities: 1,- 
struct user_struct *user;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct key *session_keyring; /* keyring inherited over fork */
struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process {CLONE_THREAD) */
struct key *thread_keyring; /* keyring private to this thread */
#endif
unsigned short used_math; 
char comm[16];
/* file system info */
int link_count, total_link_count;
/* ipc stuff */
struct sysv_sem sysvsem;
/* CPU-specific state of this task */ 
struct thread_struct thread;
/* filesystem information */ 
struct fs_struct *fs;




/* signal handlers */
struct signal_struct *signal; 
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
sigset_t blocked, real_blocked; 
struct sigpending pending;
unsigned long sas_ss_sp; 
size_t sas_ss_size; 





/* Thread group tracking */ 
u32 parent_exec_id; 
u32 self_exec_id;
/* Protection of (de-)allocation: mm, files, fs, tty, keyrings */ 
spinlock_t alloc_lock;




/* context-switch lock */
spinlock_t switch_lock;
/* journalling filesystem info */ 
void *journal_info;
/* VM state */
struct reclaim_state *reclaim_state;
struct dentry *proc_dentry
struct backing_dev_info *backing_dev_info; 
struct io_context *io_context; 
unsigned long ptrace_message;
siginfo_t *last_siginfo; /* For ptrace use. */
/ *
* current io wait handle: wait queue entry to use for io waits
* If this thread is processing aio, this points at the waitqueue
* inside the currently handled kiocb. It may be NULL (i.e. default









Appendix J: GNU General Public License
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE 
Version 2, June 1991
Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies 
of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Preamble
The licenses for most software are designed to take away your 
freedom to share and change it. By contrast, the GNU General Public 
License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change free 
software--to make sure the software is free for all its users. This 
General Public License applies to most of the Free Software 
Foundation's software and to any other program whose'authors commit to 
using it. (Some other Free Software Foundation software is covered by 
the GNU Library General Public License instead.) You can apply it to 
your programs, too.
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not 
price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you 
have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for 
this service if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it
if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it
in new free programs; and that you know you can do these things.
To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid 
anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights. 
These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for you if you 
distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it.
For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether 
gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that 
you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the 
source code. And you must show them these terms so they know their 
rights.
We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software,
and
(2) offer you this license which gives you legal permission to copy, 
distribute and/or modify the software.
Also, for each author's protection and ours, we want to make certain 
that everyone understands that there is no warranty for this free 
software. If the software is modified by someone else and passed on, 
we want its recipients to know that what they have is not the original, 
so
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that any problems introduced by others will not reflect on the original 
authors' reputations.
Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software 
patents. We wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free 
program will individually obtain patent licenses, in effect making the 
program proprietary. To prevent this, we have made it clear that any 
patent must be licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all.
The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and 
modification follow.
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
0. This License applies to any program or other work which contains 
a notice placed by the copyright holder saying it may be distributed 
under the terms of this General Public License. The "Program", below, 
refers to any such program or work, and a "work based on the Program" 
means either the Program or any derivative work under copyright law: 
that is to say, a work containing the Program or a portion of it, 
either verbatim or with modifications and/or translated into another 
language. (Hereinafter, translation is included without limitation in 
the term "modification".) Each licensee is addressed as "you".
Activities other than copying, distribution and modification are not 
covered by this License; they are outside its scope. The act of 
running the Program is not restricted, and the output from the Program 
is covered only if its contents constitute a work based on the 
Program (independent of having been made by running the Program). 
Whether that is true depends on what the Program does.
1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's 
source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you 
conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate 
copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep intact all the 
notices that refer to this License and to the absence of.any warranty; 
and give any other recipients of the Program a copy of this License 
along with the Program.
You may charge a fee for the physical act of transferring a copy, and 
you may at your option offer warranty protection in exchange for a fee.
2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion 
of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and 
distribute such modifications or work under the terms of Section 1 
above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
a) You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices 
stating that you changed the files and the date of any change.
b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in 
whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any
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part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third 
parties under the terms of this License.
c) If the modified program normally reads commands interactively 
when run, you must cause it, when started running for such 
interactive use in the most ordinary way, to print dr display an 
announcement including an appropriate copyright notice and a 
notice that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide 
a warranty) and that users may redistribute the program under 
these conditions, and telling the user how to view a copy of this 
License. (Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but 
does not normally print such an announcement, your work based on 
the Program is not required to print an announcement.)
These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole. If 
identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the Program, 
and can be reasonably considered independent and separate works in 
themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not apply to those 
sections when you distribute them as separate works. But when you 
distribute the same sections as part of a whole which is a work based 
on the Program, the distribution of the whole must be on the terms of 
this License, whose permissions for other licensees extend to the 
entire whole, and thus to each and every part regardless of who wrote 
it.
Thus, it is not the intent of this section to claim rights or contest 
your rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to 
exercise the right to control the distribution of derivative or 
collective works based on the Program.
In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program 
with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of 
a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under 
the scope of this License.
3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it, 
under Section 2) in object code or executable form under the terms of 
Sections 1 and 2 above provided that you also do one of the following:
a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable 
source code, which must be distributed under the terms of Sections 
1 and 2 above on a medium customarily used for software
interchange; or,
b) Accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three 
years, to give any third party, for a charge no more than your 
cost of physically performing source distribution, a complete 
machine-readable copy of the corresponding source code, to be 
distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium 
customarily used for software interchange; or,
c) Accompany it with the information you received as to the offer 
to distribute corresponding source code. (This alternative is 
allowed only for noncommercial distribution and only if you
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received the program in object code or executable form with such 
an offer, in accord with Subsection b above.)
The source code for a work means the preferred form of the work for 
making modifications to it. For an executable work, complete source 
code means all the source code for all modules it contains, plus any- 
associated interface definition files, plus the scripts used to 
control compilation and installation of the executable. However, as a 
special exception, the source code distributed need not include 
anything that is normally distributed (in either source or binary 
form) with the major components (compiler, kernel, and so on) of the 
operating system on which the executable runs, unless that component 
itself accompanies the executable.
If distribution of executable or object code is made by offering 
access to copy from a designated place, then offering equivalent 
access to copy the source code from the same place counts as 
distribution of the source code,' even though third parties are not 
compelled to copy the source along with the object code.
4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program 
except as expressly provided under this License. Any attempt 
otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the Program is 
void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License. 
However, parties who have received copies, or rights, from you under 
this License will not have their licenses terminated so long as such 
parties remain in full compliance.
5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not 
signed it. However, nothing else grants you permission to modify or 
distribute the Program or its derivative works. These actions are 
prohibited by law if you do not accept this License. Therefore, by 
modifying or distributing the Program (or any work based on the 
Program), you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so, and 
all its terms and conditions for copying, distributing or modifying 
the Program or works based on it.
6. Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on the 
Program), the recipient automatically receives a license from the 
original licensor to copy, distribute or modify the Program subject to 
these terms and conditions. You may not impose any further
restrictions on the recipients’ exercise of the rights granted herein.
You are not responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties to 
this License.
7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent 
infringement or for any other reason (not limited to patent issues), 
conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or 
otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not
excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot
distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this 
License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you 
may not distribute the Program at all. For example, if a patent 
license would not permit royalty-free redistribution of the Program by
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all those who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then 
the only way you could satisfy both it and this License would be to 
refrain entirely from distribution of the Program.
If any portion of this section is held invalid or unenforceable under 
any particular circumstance, the balance of the section is intended to 
apply and the section as a whole is intended to apply in other 
circumstances.
It is not the purpose of this section to induce you to infringe any 
patents or other property right claims or to contest validity of any 
such claims; this section has the sole purpose of protecting the 
integrity of the free software distribution system, which is 
implemented by public license practices. Many people have made 
generous contributions to the wide range of software distributed 
through that system in reliance on consistent application of that 
system; it is up to the author/donor to decide if he or she is willing 
to distribute software through any other system and a licensee cannot 
impose that choice.
This section is intended to make thoroughly clear what is believed to 
be a consequence of the rest of this License.
8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in 
certain countries either by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the 
original copyright holder who places the Program under this License 
may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation excluding 
those countries, so that distribution is permitted only in or among 
countries not thus excluded. In such case, this License incorporates 
the limitation as if written in the body of this License.
9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new 
versions of the General Public License from time to time. Such new 
versions will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may 
differ in detail to address new problems or concerns.
Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program 
specifies a version number of this License which applies to it and "any 
later version", you have the option of following the terms and 
conditions either of that version or of any later version published by 
the Free Software Foundation. If the Program does not specify a 
version number of this License, you may choose any version ever 
published by the Free Software Foundation.
10. If you wish to incorporate parts of the Program into other free 
programs whose distribution conditions are different, write to the 
author to ask for permission. For software which is copyrighted by the 
Free
Software Foundation, write to the Free Software Foundation; we 
sometimes make exceptions for this. Our decision will be guided by the 
two goals of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free 
software and of promoting the sharing and reuse of software generally.
NO WARRANTY
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11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO 
WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. 
EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR 
OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, 
EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS 
WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF 
ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN 
WRITING
WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY.WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR 
REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR 
DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM 
(INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED 
INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF 
THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR 
OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
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